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ABSTRACT 2
INVESTMENT AND RETURNS IN EXPLORATION
AND THE IMPACT ON OIL AND NATURAL GAS SUPPLY
by
Krishna Challa
An econometric model is developed to explain 'the investment in
exploratory activity and the resulting accumulation of proved reserves
of oil and natural gas in the continental United States. The model
explicitly takes into account therole of geological uncertainty as well
as the effect of depletion in the context of a finite resource base.
The model for reserve additions describes the process of generating
new discoveries of oil and natural gas in two stages. The first stage
describes investment in exploration under conditions of geological
uncertainty and a continuing process of depletion of the hydrocarbon
resource base. Exploratory companies are assumed to choose a level of
investment that maximizes the firm's value after balancing expected
returns against the risks involved in exploration and the corresponding
costs. Combined with a characterization of costs of exploration and
development, this analysis leads to an expression for the total amount
of exploratory drilling in each production district in terms of
estimates of anticipated returns and anticipated risk. In the second
stage, the model predicts the parameters of the size distribution of
alternative drilling prospects, and updates them from period to period
to reflect the continuing process of depletion of prospects as well
as new information on geological and economic variables. The amount
of drilling activity can then be translated into actual discoveries
of oil and natural gas through the estimates of success fractions and
sizes of discovery (conditional on a success), which depend on these
parameters. Structuring the model in this way enables us to take
account of possible shifts in the relative proportions of extensive and
intensive drilling as a result of changes in economic variables.
Additions to proved reserves can also occur as a result of
extensions and revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions and
revisions are modelled as functions of previous discoveries, exploratory
wells drilled, existing levels of accumulated reserves and production,
and an index of geological depletion.
An important aspect of the model is that it gives explicit
consideration to the process of long term geological depletion as
well as the rle of risk in determining the amount of exploratory
activity. It also accounts for the fact that on the level of new
0
3discoveries oil and natural gas are in fact joint products, and
must be treated symmetrically. Finally, the model allows for shifts
in the relative proportions of intensive and extensive drilling in
response to changes in economic incentives.
The model is estimated and simulated to verify its pre-
dictive validity over a historic period. It is then used to examine
the influence of alternative regulatory policies on the oil and natural
gas reserves and production. Combined with an existing model of
demand for oil and natural gas (the MacAvoy-Pindyck Model), this
provides a basis for estimating future shortages and increases in
economic incentives needed to ameliorate them.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Historical Background and Setting of the Study
The economics of the oil and natural gas industry in the United
States has been a subject of much controversy in recent years. This is
not surprising when one keeps in mind the dramatic changes that have oc-
curred in the domestic and world petroleum markets over the last three
decades.
As late as in 1946, the United States was shipping more oil
overseas than it was importing. With the advent of the flourishing low-
cost production of the Middle East and Venezuela, this positive balance
was never to be realized again. Imports from overseas increased fourfold
by 1955 (even though prices were already at twice the levels of the
early post-war years) and continued in this trend in the face of the
seemingly unlimited supply potential of the Middle East. By 1959, con-
cern about the survival of a healthy domestic petroleum industry and
related issues of national security became very significant. In March
1959 the mandatory Oil Import Program went into effect to provide in-
centive for increased domestic exploration and to protect the domestic
producers. The controversial import controls were in effect until they
were discontinued in April 1973 in the face of sharply rising import
prices. By the fall of 1973, Persian Gulf prices had far surpassed con-
trolled U.S. prices. Firm action by the Oil Cartel (OPEC) led to in-
creases in Persian Gulf export prices of about $3.10 in September, 1973
12
to $8.30 per barrel in January, 1974, as well as a threat of a total
Arab oil embargo.
The natural gas market presents a history of equally interesting
changes. Prior to World War II there was no economical way of transport-
ing gas more than moderate distances. Extensive venting and flaring of
natural gas was a common occurrence in the surplus Gulf states in the
United States because markets were confined to the immediate producing
areas. With the development of economical long-distance pipelines, the
large natural gas reserves discovered in the search for oil became avail-
able nationwide. Subsequently, exploration for natural gas had become
worthwhile in its own right. The production of gas had risen from about
5 trillion cubic feet in the early fifties to more than 20 trillion cubic
feet by the early seventies. Natural gas differs dramatically from crude
oil with respect to governmental price regulation. Oil prices were not
regulated at the well-head or the refinery (until the August 1971 general
price "freeze"). In contrast, producer prices of natural gas at the well-
head have been under regulation by the Federal Power Commission (F.P.C.).
Following the Supreme Court decision in the Phillips Petroleum case in
1954,1 the F.P.C. has been using "Area Rate Regulation", i.e., "ust and
reasonable" price ceilings are set for a specified geographic area on the
basis of estimated costs and returns averaged over that entire area.
1Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
2For detailed accounts of how the "Area Rates" are set, see, for
example, U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Hugeton-Anadarko Area Rate Pro-
ceeding," Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission, 44 FPC 761,
1970; or U.S. Federal Power Commission, "Southern Louisiana Area Rate
Proceeding," Annual Report of the Federal Power Commission, 46 FPC 86,
1971.
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The basis for regulating well-head prices (as distinct from regulation
of pipeline and distribution companies which may be considered natural
monopolies in case of natural gas) has always been a controversial and
puzzling matter, evoking much debate among legislators, industry spokesmen
and academicians. In any case, the natural gas industry has been trans-
formed from a relatively free market of the late fifties (when price
ceilings set by F.P.C. were close to or higher than the prevailing market
clearing prices) to one of strict regulation by the middle sixties. By
somewhere between 1968 and 1970, shortages were beginning to affect
consumers and led first to cutting off supplies in peak periods to in-
dustry and eventually (by 1972) to curtailments to all classes of cus-
tomers. 3'4 The Federal Power Commission shows that natural gas distribu-
tors were 3.7 percent short of meeting consumption demands of communities-
and industries in 1971, and are expected to be 10 percent short of demands
in 1974 [45]. During the period 1960-1973, the reserves-to-production
ratio of natural gas dropped from 20 to nearly 11
1See, for example, Hawkins [17], Garfield and Lovejoy [13],
MacAvoy [27, 28], and MacAvoy and Pindyck [29].
2See Mitchell [33].
3See [46].
4Note that shortages were evident in the reserves markets(as
opposed to production market) much earlier. Demand for proved reserves
exceeded the supply of new additions to reserves by 1965.
Interest in the workings of the natural gas and oil industry
in the United States is further enhanced most recently by the declared
policy of independence from foreign supplies of energy. Under the name
"Project Independence," goals have been set which call for complete self-
sufficiency by the end of the decade, to free the nation from the threat
of sharp price increases and import cut-downs from sources abroad.l
As one might expect in the face of this background, much of the
debate and discussion centers around the responsiveness of the supply of
oil and natural gas reserves to economic incentives. For example, in
defending the oil depletion allowance, industry spokesmen had asserted
that crude oil discoveries were quite sensitive to price incentives. The
case for either stronger regulation3 or deregulation of natural gas
field prices also rests on arguments of price-sensitivity or price-
insensitivity. The question of the sensitivity of exploration and dis-
covery to economic incentives is the question that this study is mainly
addressed to. However, answering a policy question of this kind requires
building of a relatively sophisticated econometric policy model that
takes into account all the geological and economic inter-relationships
1New York Times, May 8, 1974, p. 72.
2See, for example, Gonzales [15].
3See testimony of Alfred E. Kahn, The Permian Basin Area Rate
Proceeding, U. S. Federal Power Commission Docket AR61-1, 1960.
4See Erickson and Sapnn [10], MacAvoy and Pindyck [29] and
Spann and Erickson [38].
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of the oil and natural gas industry. In the next three chapters of this
thesis, such a model is therefore built, tested, and applied to examine
alternative policies.
Chapter II gives the theoretical basis for the present model
of exploration and discovery. Structural relationships are derived in
this chapter on the basis of a consideration of the physical (geological)
as well as economic aspects of exploratory drilling. The model so spe-
cified is econometrically estimated in Chapter III. The choices on data
used and econometric procedures are discussed in detail in that chapter.
In Chapter IV, the econometric model is first simulated over a historical
period of time to check its predictive validity and then used to examine
the price responsiveness of oil and natural gas supply under alternative
regulatory and economic conditions. Chapter V summarizes the major
conclusions from this study.
1.2 Previous Studies
The pioneering study of supply response of oil and gas reserves
has been that of Fisher [12] in 196h. He used a three-stage model with
estimating equations for total wildcat wells, success ratio and the aver-
age size of' discovery. New discoveries are then computed as the product
of these three estimates. His contribution was important in that it
illustrated the distinction between the response of wildcat drilling to
economic incentives and that of discoveries. When economic incentives
are increased, not only total exploratory activity goes up, but the aver-
age characteristics of the prospects drilled change because it now becomes
worthwhile to drill poorer prospects. Thus it should be expected that
discoveries of reserves would be less sensitive than wildcat drilling to
price changes. The problem with the Fisher study is that the specifica-
tion of his structural equations had no theoretical basis, other than
expected direction of the effects of different explanatory variables.
This leads to many difficulties in the interpretation of his results as
well as possible econometric biases.
There has been surprisingly little improvement in the struc-
tural specification of supply models over the next decade. Erickson and
Spann [10, 11, 38] extend the basic Fisher framework to include considera-
tions of joint costs of exploration for oil and natural gas. Since oil
and natural gas are joint products from the viewpoint of exploration,
they should be treated as such. This point was very well illustrated
by Erickson and Spann (E-S). They derive constraints that must be obeyed
by own-price and cross-price elasticities in the joint-product case and
impose these constraints in estimating their econometric equations. Their
model was a definite step in improving the specification, but continues
to have some of the same problems as Fisher's. Some of their price elas-
ticity estimates came out to be unreasonably largeI and may be the result
of the remaining problems in the specification - especially a lack of
explicit consideration of the depletion of the finite natural resource
base.
1For example, an own-price elasticity of more than 3.0 was re-
ported for natural gas discoveries in [38].
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Khazzoom [21,23] visualizes the discovery of natural gas re-
serves as a response to a signal (gas or oil price) through a "black box"
which includes such factors as the number of wildcats drilled, success
in drilling and directionality. He concedes that the price signal
triggers the drilling decision which determines simultaneously the
number of wildcats drilled, the success ratio, directionality and the
average size of discoveries. He nevertheless proceeds to estimate the
output of the black box directly in terms of the inputs and stresses the
lagged distributive effects of prices rather than structural aspects of
natural gas industry. The structural specification of this model should
therefore be considered inferior to both the Fisher and E-S models. Much
of the explanatory power in his estimated equations derives from the
lagged endogeneous variables. There are well-known problems of econo-
metric bias associated with using lagged endogeneous variables as an
explanatory variable.
The MacAvoy-Pindyck (M-P) model treats simultaneously the field
market for reserves (gas producers dedicated new reserves to pipeline
companies at the well-head price) and the wholesale market for production
(pipeline companies selling gas to public utilities and industrial users).
The linking of the two markets for purposes of policy simulation is the
innovation of the M-P approach. On the field market side (the supply
side), they study the exploratory process in two stages - exploratory
drilling and average size of discoveries per exploratory well.. This
avoids the difficulties of modelling the success ratio, admittedly the
weakest link in the Fisher-ES estimations, but difficulties with the
structural specification still remain.
In the present study, an attempt is made to derive structural
relationships that reflect more closely the geological and economic in-
terrelationships in the exploration and discovery process. In particular,
available empirical evidence [4, 19, 42] on the geological size distribu-
tions of reservoirs and the physics of the evolution of a play [18, 20]
was incorporated into the structural specification of the equations de-
termining the characteristics of the average prospect drilled. In addi-
tion, the relationship determining the total exploratory wells is derived
from an explicit characterization of the individual explorer's prefer-
ences. Finally, explanatory variables are introduced to represent re-
source deflation and geological uncertainty associated with exploration.
A caveat is probably appropriate for the benefit of a potential
researcher in this field. Supply models in the area of oil and natural
gas exploration are faced with serious data problems. Some of the most
interesting (disaggregated) information on wells as well as reserves
happens to be confidential information of the producing companies and is
not available publicly. Also, the geographic data are frequently aggre-
gated by political units (e.g., states or F.P.C. production districts)
rather than by geologically meaningful areas. The challenge lies in
formulating reasonable economic and technical relationships in the face
of these formidable data problems.
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CHAPTER II
A THEORY OF EXPLORATION AND DISCOVERY OF
NATURAL GAS AND OIL RESERVES
2.1 Nature of the Exploratory Process
The goal of exploration is to gain information on whether a
certain structure is productive of oil or natural gas and if productive,
the probable size of the reserve underground. Thus the chief product of
exploratory activity is knowledge, which can be exploited by consequent
developmental drilling activity, building of surface facilities to with-
draw the hydrocarbon and delivering to an oil refinery or a natural gas
pipeline company as the case may be. The primary component of reserves
additions resulting from exploratory activity are "new discoveries."
These may later be added to by "extensions" which result from further ex-
ploratory drilling in the neighborhood of a newly discovered field or pool.
Estimates of both new discoveries and extensions may be revised from time
to time as new geological and other technical information arrives. This
leads to the last category of reserves additions called "revisions."
The process of exploration and discovery, and the resulting ac-
cumulation of new reserves, are probably the parts of the oil and gas in-
dustry that are the most difficult to capture in a conceptual model. Much
of the current controversy over regulatory policy centers, however, on
this process--whether or not reserve additions have been "too low" as a
result of past regulatory policy. Although the exploration and discovery
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process is a complicated one, involving many geological and technological
factors, structural econometric relationships can be formulated to link
economic, geological and technological variables that govern reserve addi-
tions and describe in a simple manner the effects of regulatory policy.
2.2 Summary of the Model
The model for reserve additions describes the process of gener-
ating new discoveries of oil and natural gas in two stages. The first
stage describes investment in exploration under conditions of geological
uncertainty and a continuing process of depletion of the hydrocarbon re-
source base. Exploratory companies are assumed to choose a level of in-
vestment that maximizes the firm's value after balancing expected returns
against the risks involved in exploration and the corresponding costs.
Combined with a characterization of costs of exploration and development,
this analysis leads to an expression for the total amount of exploratory
drilling in each production district in terms of estimates of anticipated
returns and anticipated risk.
As has been mentioned earlier, producers engaged in exploratory
activity have a portfolio of drilling options available, and must make a
trade-off between risk and return (i.e., extensive versus intensive drill-
ing) in choosing among these options. The set of prospects relevant to
the individual explorer's decision-making process are those lying on the
current "efficient frontier" l of the inventory of prospects. The second
1This term is explained more elaborately in a later part of this
chapter.
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stage of the model predicts the parameters of the size distribution of
the currently efficient drilling prospects and updates them from period
to period to reflect the continuing process of depletion of prospects as
well as new information on geological and economic variables. Structuring
the model this way enables us to take into account possible shifts in the
relative proportions of "'extensive" and "intensive "l drilling as a result
of changes in economic variables. The amount of drilling activity can
then be translated into actual discoveries of oil and natural gas through
the estimates of success fractions and sizes of discovery (conditional
on a success), which depend on these parameters.
Additions to proved reserves can also occur as a result of ex-
tensions and revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions and re-
visions are modelled as functions of previous discoveries, exploratory
wells drilled,-existing levels of accumulated reserves and production,
and an index of geological depletion.
An important aspect of the model is that it gives explicit con-
sideration to the process of long term geological depletion as well as
the role of risk in determining the amount of exploratory activity. It
also accounts for the fact that on the level of new discoveries oil and
natural gas are in fact joint products, and must be treated symmetrically.
Finally, the model allows for shifts in the relative proportions of in-
tensive and extensive drilling in response to changes in economic incentives.
1These terms are explained more elaborately in a later part of
this chapter.
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2.3 Investment in Exploration and A
Valuation Model for Exploratory Activity
The aggregate industry supply function for exploratory wells
drilled is, of course, the composite of the individual drilling decisions
of several explorers (typically small and large exploratory companies)
operating simultaneously. The individual driller makes his decisions
after taking into account all of the currently available information that
can help him ascertain expected return and risk in exploratory drilling,
as well as the relevant costs.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that individual explora-
tory firms have a range of drilling options available, each with its own
expected risk and expected return, and that a set of options are chosen
that will maximize the present value of the certainty equivalent cash
flow resulting from exploration. We also assume that risk can be repre-
sented by the variance of the cash flow. Then following the theoretical
framework suggested in the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin capital asset pricing
1This is based on the single-period mean-variance model for
pricing of capital assets under uncertainty developed by Sharpe [371,
Lintner [25] and Mossin [34]. Consider a single-period world in which
all investors are risk-wise expected utility maximizers whose investment
decisions can be characterized by the maximization of a preference func-
tion Ui(Wi, ei, vi where Wi is the individual's wealth at the beginning
of the period, ei is the expected value of the cash flow to be generated
one period hence by the investor's portfolio, and vi is the variance of
this cash flow. If one assumes that Ui/aWi>O, Ui/3ei>0O and Ui/Dvi<0,
and that all investors have homogeneous expectations and that transac-
tions costs and taxes are zero, then equation (l)a holds. In that equa-
tion the certainty equivalent of a random cash flow Hi is expressed as
its expectation minus a risk discount equal to the product of the price
per unit risk X and the risk of the firm given by the sum of its variance
and covariances with all other firms.
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model, we can write the value of the Jth firm will be given by
Vj = (/r)(n - a j) (1)a
where II is the total end-of-period cash flow to firm j, j = E ) is the
expected value of IHi ajm is the covariance of II. with Hm ,the total cash
flow to all firms in the economy, and X is an average index of risk
aversion.
The traditional version of the capital asset pricing model assumes
that each investor actively participates in the entire market for capital
assets and that all capital assets are infinitely divisible. This leads
to the restriction X should equal the market price of unit risk as de-
termined by equilibrium in the entire capital market. In case of the
market for oil and natural gas prospects, we avoid the above two assump-
ions in view of the fact that a majority of wildcatters are "small-time"
operators--either individuals or small privately held companies whose
owners have a major portion of their portfolios invested in the activity
of petroleum exploration. Moreover, it is generally agreed that most ex-
plorers consider the geological unpredictability, rather than other eco-
nomic factors as the main source of uncertainty in exploration. Geologi-
cal uncertainty is specific to the particular prospect being considered:
we would expect little correlation between the amounts of oil or natural
gas discovered from a given and the economic returns for the rest of the
firms in the economy. The measure of risk ajm can therefore be replaced
in this case by var(nj), the own variance of the cash flows to the jth
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exploratory firm.1 Taken together, these considerations lead us to drop
the restriction that X must equal the price per unit risk as determined
by the entire capital market. Instead it represents an average index of
risk aversion among individuals engaged in petroleum exploration. Thus
we modify (1)a to
Nr = (i/r)(.j - X Var(j)) (l)b
Now let us examine how each firm can choose drilling options
that will maximize V. At any point in time there is an inventory of un-
drilled prospects about which some information is available. Depending
on which geological sub-population they belong to, the prospects vary in
expected return after correcting for the costs involved, and the corres-
ponding risks are measured by the variances of these returns. The utility
maximizing behavior on the part of several risk-averse explorers operating
simultaneously leads them to always strive for prospects that yield the
highest expected return for a given level of risk, or, conversely, pros-
pects that have the lowest level of risk for a specified mean return, i.e.,
prospects that are on an efficient frontier which may be represented as
an upward sloping curve in the risk-return plane, as shown in Figure 2.1.
1One might expect significant positive correlations between size
of discoveries from one prospect and from an adjacent prospect. This
means some of the covariance terms in jm will not equal zero. However,
when two or more prospects are likely to exhibit high correlations in
terms of geological returns, the drillers are likely to treat the whole
"package" as a single prospect. The individual driller would drill only
one prospect out of the package and wait for information to flow from
this before he even considers drilling the other prospects in the package.
This preserves the "geological independence" assumption.
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Figure 2.1 - Efficient Frontier
Prospects lying on this frontier are efficient in the sense that
they dominate the rest of the prospects currently in the inventory in a
risk-return sense, and at any point in time an individual driller need
only consider these prospects in making his drilling decisions. The
frontier would include small and relatively certain prospects such as
point B as well as large but less certain prospects such as point A. The par-
ticular prospect chosen, if any, would depend on the individual preference
function--more specifically, its degree of risk-aversion. The more risk-
averse the explorer, the more likely it is that he will choose prospects
yielding small but relatively certain returns--i.e., that he will drill
intensively.
This might be related to the traditional distinction between the
extensive and intensive modes of drilling behavior. Extensive drilling
corresponds to points such as A in Figure 2.1 where relatively few wells
are drilled, but those that are drilled usually go out beyond the frontiers
of recent discoveries to open up new geographical locations or previously
· \r
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neglected deeper strata at old locations. Typically, this would include
drilling farther offshore, or onshore but at very great depth. The
probability of discovering oil or natural gas in these cases is small,
but the size of discovery in case of success is expected to be large. On
the other hand, when drilling is done intensively, many wells are drilled
in an area which had already proven to be a more likely source of hydro-
carbon discovery. Points such as B on the frontier correspond to intensive
drilling. Typically the probability of discovering new hydrocarbon de-
posits is large in these cases, but the size of discoveries is likely to
be relatively small.
2.4 The Number of Exploratory Wells Drilled
Either or both of natural gas and oil may be discovered as a
result of exploratory well drilling. Suppose that in a given period the
jth explorer is considering drilling a set of independent prospects which
are expected to yield mean dollar receipts RWj per exploratory well from
oil and gas discoveries. Let (RW). represent the corresponding variance
%
of dollar receipts per exploratory well. The expected net return E(Hj)
from drilling W. wells may then be expressed in terms of -.j and Ce(Wj),
the expected total costs of exploration and development of W wells are
drilled:
E(H) = Wj . RWj - Ce(WJ (2)
If RWGj and RWO. are the mean sizes of discoveries respectively of natural
V V
gas and oi:L per exploratory well, (RWG)j, (RWO)J the corresponding vari-
ances, and PGe and POe the expected prices of natural gas and oil respec-
tively, then we may write
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RWj = k (RWGj PGe + RWOJ · pOe) (3)
and E() = k(Wj * RWG * pGe + W RO.j POe) - e(wj) (4)
Where k is a multiplicative factor that accounts for the fact that dis-
coveries may be extended or revised at a later time.
Probably the largest source of uncertainty in returns from ex-
ploration is geological unpredictability, i.e., the randomness of dis-
covery size. For simplicity the economic parameters will therefore be
assumed to be known with certainty so that
Var(j) = Wj (RWr (5)
or VTar( ) k2[W · (RWG ) (PGe)2 + Wj(RWOj ) (O e) i (6)
if no significant correlations exist between oil and gas discoveries.
Let us now examine the components of total expected costs, Ce(W.).
This is composed of the cost of exploration CE and the cost of subsequent
development activity CD. Although there is little theory establishing a
functional relationship between explorations costs and wells drilled, we
can observe that (1) costs vary in total and at the margin from one pro-
duction district to another, depending on average well depth, rock perme-
ability and other geological conditions, and (2) costs per well in a given
drilling district seem to rise with the total number of wells drilled in
that district within a specific period, i.e., average costs are increasing.
The second observation is analagous to the popular assumption, found in
many studies of investment behavior,l that the costs per unit of investment
1See, for example, Eisner and Strotz [10], Gould [16], Lucas [26]
and Treadway [ 4].
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are positively related to the rate of investment. In the case of ex-
ploratory activity, this may arise due to a) rapidly rising installations
and reorganization costs when a firm is forced to adjust to a new capacity
within a shorter period of time, and (b) higher purchase costs of items
in limited supply such as drilling rigs and wire products required for
drilling and skilled labor. We will model exploration costs by a quad-
ratic cost function, so that the cost of drilling W wells is:
CE(Wj) = a + Wj + y(Wj)2 (7)
Data on historical average drilling costs (ATC) in each district provide
one index of the geological factors affecting costs in a particular dis-
trict, so that we posit:
= So + 1 ' ATC
which gives us
CE(Wj) = aW + a2 ATC +a3(j) (8)
where a, a a2 and a3 are constant parameters.
The cost of subsequent development activity is governed partly
by the same geological factors that affect exploratory costs (e.g., depth,
rock permeability, shape of the decline curve, type of drive, etc.) and
also by the amount of reserves withdrawn from ground. This leads us to
assume
CD(W) = k + klWj RW + k2 ATC (9)
Substituting expressions (8) and (9) into (2), we obtain an expression
for expected net return of the form
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E() = b + b bl b2 (Wj RWj) + b W ATC + b4(W) (10)
Now we can substitute equation (5) for Var (ij) and equation (10)
for j in equation (l)b. Then, differentiating the resulting expression
with respect to the number of exploratory wells drilled (so as to maximize
Vj), we obtain the following expression for WXTj, the total number of ex-
ploratory wells drilled by firm j:
WXT = cO + c RW. + c2 ATC (RW
Aggregating over all firms in the district, we therefore expect to find
a relationship of the form
WXT = c 1 + cRWR + c3 (ATC) (11)
Here RW and (RW) stand for the values of the mean and variance of dollar
receipts averaged over all the exploratory wells drilled in the district.
Notice that because of our one-period formulation, the riskless
interest rate r cancels out and does not appear in the final expression
for total exploratory wells drilled. This would be correct only if costs
and corresponding revenues occurred in the same period. Since there are
in fact considerable lags between investment outlays for exploration and
accrual of revenues from reserves discovered, we include an interest rate
term as an additional explanatory variable in equation (11). Since an
adjustment for the risk in exploration has already been made, the appropri-
ate rate of interest to use would be the AAA bond rate (INTA). Adding
this term, and substituting for RW and (RW) the aggregate average values
of the parameters RWG, RWO, (RWG) and (RWO), we obtain the estimating
equation for exploratory wells to be:
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WXT = c0 + cl (RWG PGe + RWO POe) + c2 [(RWGJ(PGe)2 + (RWO)
(poe)2 ] + 3 (ATC) + c4 (INTA) (12)
2.5 The Geological Environment and
the Process of Depletion
A single production district will in general contain reservoirs
of distinctly different geological types. However, following Kaufman et
al. (1974) we shall assume that reservoirs can be classified into a finite
number of geologically homogeneous "sub-populations." A play begins when
an exploratory well leads to the discovery of the first reservoir in a
sub-population. Drilling then continues into the sub-population until
the economic returns from drilling no longer compensate for the associated
costs and risks.
Our description of the physical evolution of a play and the re-
lated process of geological depletion relies on the following three postu-
lates suggested by Kaufman et al. (1974), and supported by several earlier
empirical studies including Arps and Roberts (1958), Kaufman (1963) and
Uhler and Bradley (1970):
I. The size distribution (in barrels of oil or Mcf of natural
gas) of petroleum deposits in reservoirs within a sub-popu-
lation is lognormal.
II. Within a sub-population of deposits the probability that the
next discovery will be of a given size is proportional to
the ratio of that size to the sum of sizes of as yet undis-
covered reservoirs within the sub-population.
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III. Conditional on a play beginning within a sub-population,
the probability that an exploratory well will discover a
new reservoir is proportional to the ratio of the sum of
volumes of the as yet undiscovered reservoirs to the total
unexplored volume of potentially hydro-carbon bearing sedi-
ment.
Postulates I and II together can be used to determine the proba-
bilistic behavior of the amounts of oil or gas discovered by each suc-
cessful well in the order of discovery. Postulate II implies that on the
average the larger reservoirs will be found first, and that as the dis-
covery process continues, sizes of discovery tend to decline. The third
postulate is related to the behavior of success ratios once a play has
begun. Postulates I, II and III can be used together to show that within
a given sub-population, as the play unfolds, the probability of success
tends to decrease, as does the average size of discovery. The result,
then, of geological depletion, is to shift the efficient frontier of
Figure 2.1 towards the left. This may in part be compensated for by ad-
dition of some new, hitherto unknown, prospects to the efficient set, but
these additions are the result of new geological information acquired
during the activity of exploratory drilling in the previous period, and
are relatively unpredictable.
2.6 Influence of Economic Variables on the
Distribution of Size of New Discoveries
So far we have confined ourselves to the dynamics of the average
sizes of new discoveries and probabilities of success within a given
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sub-population of reservoirs. However, a single production district may
contain more than one sub-population with varying geological characteris-
tics. For example, the geological types of some sub-populations might
be such that the average size of reservoirs in them is quite large, but
drilling for these prospects involves high risk (low probability of suc-
cess). Just the reverse (small reservoir sizes but high success proba-
bilities) might be true for other sub-populations within the same district.
This fact is relevant to the influence of shift in the economic incentives
on the size distribution of discoveries.
A change in economic incentives (e.g., a price rise) may have
two effects on the pattern of drilling in a given district. First, it
may accelerate the rate of drilling within individual sub-populations,
and this would hasten the process of depletion. However, following our
three postulates, it is reasonable to assume that the physical process
of depletion as well as the process of acquiring new geological knowledge
within a subpopulation will remain unaltered, if it is measured on a scale
of cumulative successful wells drilled into it. That is, economic vari-
ables-may influence the rate of exploratory drilling within a sub-popula-
tion while not altering size distribution or probabilities of discovery
when plotted on a scale of cumulative wells.
Secondly, shifts in economic incentives may lead to shifts in
the relative proportions of drilling in the different sub-populations
within a district. For instance, a large price rise may increase explora-
tory drilling in a high-risk sub-population at a substantially higher rate
than that in a low risk sub-population. This means drilling in the district
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would, on the average, shift towards a more extensive mode. More in-
tensive drilling would be the result if a price rise had the opposite
effect.
In order to separate the physical process of discoveries from
the influence of economic variables, we shall use the number of success-
ful exploratory wells as the scale of measurement of elapsed duration
within a play. This leads to substantial simplifications in modelling
the discovery and depletion process. With this structure, once the number
of exploratory wells drilled in a given time interval is known, the model
automatically generates a description of the associated depletion process.
2.7 New Plays
The discussion so far has dealt with the evolution of a play,
once it has begun. The task of articulating the conditions under which
a new play begins is a much more formidable one. New geological knowledge
is generated by fresh geophysical surveys as well as from information
arising out of exploratory well drilling in adjacent areas. Most of the
potentially oil- or gas-bearing land in the onshore district has already
undergone at least some amount of geophysical survey. In view of this,
and in the absence of a better theory, we assume that new increments in
geological knowledge (that may eventually lead to beginning of new plays)
are proportional to the number of successful exploratory wells drilled in
that region in the recent past.l Admittedly, this is a crude measure of
1Dry wells too may contribute some new geological information, but
most of the useful information arrives from an analysis of the character-
istics of a newly-found reservoir.
new geological knowledge, but knowledge does improve as more wells are
drilled and more of the surrounding areas are explored.
Exploratory drilling activity with an intention of generating a
new play (i.e., discovering a brand new sub-population of reservoirs)
may be thought of as an extreme form of extensive drilling. This is the
approach taken in this model. As long as some information is available
about such prospects, they may be plotted on the graph of the efficient
frontier in Figure 2.1 and th-as enter the individual explorer's decision
in the same ways as all the other prospects.
2.8 The Dynamics of Discovery Size
Having described the physical laws governing the evolution of
the discovery and depletion process, we can now develop the dynamics of
the size distribution of reservoirs as drilling continues. Let 6 repre-
sent the mean rate of decline in the size of new reservoirs discovered
in the k sub-populations. For reasons discussed in sections 2.5 and
2.6, the mean rate of decline is expressed in units of proportional de-
cline per successful exploratory well drilled. Let Pk(t) be the true
mean size of the subset of reservoirs discovered at time t in the kth
sub-population and sk(t), a random variable representing the anticipated
size of the next reservoir discovered in this sub-population. Based on
the postulates and evidence cited in section 2.5, sk(t) may be assumed
1
to be lognormally distributed, at least to a reasonable approximation.l
Then if WXS [tl; t2] denotes the total number of successful exploratory
1 (See following page i'or footnote.)
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wells (gas or oil) drilled into the k sub-population during the time
interval [t;l, t2], the anticipated size of the next reservoir discovered
as at time (t + h) would be lognormally distributed with
E[sk (t-h)] = k (t) - 6k k (t) WXSk [t; t + h] = k (t + h) (13)
and
2 2 2 2
Var[sk (t + h)] = (t + h) a = P (t)ak for small h (14)
(see previous page)
1Strictly speaking, if the original size distribution of reservoirs
in nature was lognormal, the distribution of the "sampled" reservoirs at
any point during the evolution of a play would not be exactly lognormal.
This is so as a result of the natural process of sampling without replace-
ment and proportional to random size. However, most of the empirical
studies on size distributions of reservoirs themselves were based on dis-
tributions of sample observations. The only promising approach to de-
termine the empirical size distributions of reservoirs after correcting
for this bias in sampling has been that of Kaufman et al. (1974). Based
on highly disaggregated data on wells drilled and sizes of reservoirs
found in order of their discovery in the Alberta Province (Canada), they
have concluded that in most cases the lognormal assumption is still
reasonable for reservoir size distributions in nature. After developing
a mathematical description of a play based on the postulates very similar
to the ones we are using, they used the mathematical model to simulate
the size distribution of reservoirs already "sampled out" as well as
that of the as yet undiscovered reservoirs under various assumptions of
total number of reservoirs in the population and number in the observed
sample. The findings of this study indicate that lognormal approximation
would be reasonable for the set of sampled reservoirs as long as the num-
ber of reservoirs already discovered is only a small fraction of the
total number of reservoirs in the original sub-population. This condi-
tion is not unreasonable to assume because, as a general rule, only the
largest 5 percent or fewer of the deposits can actually be recovered
before making the exploratory activity economically untenable.
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where k is the variance parameter associated with the lognormal density
governing sk. The parameters k and k are characteristics of the kth
sub-population and are assumed to remain constant over the range of geo-
logical depletion we are concerned with. Thus over a small interval of
time h, the mean rate of decline in the size of discovery per successful
well drilled is
1 (sk(t + h) - k (t))
Ew 1 = k_ (15)
WXS [t; t + h] Pk (t)
and the variance of the rate of decline per successful well (for small h)
is
1 sk (t + h) 2
Var{wxs [t; t + h] Pk(t) r= ok
Since the error variance in (16) is constant over time, we can
estimate 6 by a simple ordinary least squares regression of the
relationship in (15) without the expectation operator on the left-hand
side. The standard error of regression in this estimation would directly
give us a consistent estimate of the variance parameter ak.
Note that under our set of assumptions, as long as an estimate
of the mean size of reservoirs k at some initial point in time is avail-
able, knowledge of the values of the two parameters 6k and ok is sufficient
to describe fully for our purposes the dynamics of the probability distri-
bution of discovery sizes on a scale of lagged cumulative successful wells
in the following sense: Given an estimate of the mean size of pk(tO) at
some initial point in time to, we can predict (using the relations (15)
and (16) repeatedly) the mean size of discoveries as well as the variance
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of the discovery sizes at any subsequent point in time t as long as we
know the number of successful wells drilled into this sub-population
WXS [to; tl] during the interval between t and tl. In this way determina-
tion of 6k and k describes fully, at least for the purpose of our analy-
k k
sis, the discovery and depletion process in the kt h sub-population.
The above procedure for determining discovery size distributions
will now be modified in four ways--with a goal partly to improve the spe-
cification of the model and partly to facilitate a better and more con-
venient econometric procedure.
First, in the above discussion it has been assumed that it is
possible to observe values of sk, the size of individual discoveries. In
reality this data is confidential information of the producing and is not
available, and for estimation purposes we must use the average sk[t-O, t+O]
of the sizes of all reservoirs discovered in a specified small interval of
time [t-e, t+e].
Second, referring to the estimating equation (15), the term
(sk(t + h) - k(t)/Pk(t) denotes an estimate of the percentage change in
average size during the time interval [t; t + h], and will be replaced
1
by A(log k). We can now estimate equation (15) in the more convenient
form
log (k(t + h)) = log (k(t)) - c WXSk[t; t + h] (17)
lIt is easy to verify that for small values of h, the approxima-
tion is very close. The replacement leads to substantial convenience in
econometric estimation and simulation.
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The value of cO estimated from this regression gives an estimate of 6k.
Third, we have thus far assumed that the parameter 6k represent-
ing the mean rate of decline in size is constant throughout the evolution
of a play. This may not be a bad assumption during the earlier stages of
the evolution when the size of as yet unexploited resource base is very
large relative to the amount of incremental depletion occurring in one
period (say, a year). However, in cases where the accumulated geological
depletion of the resource base in the region has reached more advanced
levels, the finiteness of the resource base becomes a factor to be reckoned
with. The rate of decline in discovery sizes is likely to be steeper
where the exploratory firms are operating at levels close to the operating
at levels close to the total exhaustion of resource base. A large per-
centage of the reservoirs found in these cases will not even be economically
recoverable.
To capture this effect, we define the following index of accumu-
lated depletion (or exhaustion) of the resource base:
Estimate of total Cumulative Current estimate
original oil (or - production - of proved
DEP = v natural gas) in place to date resources
Estimate of original oil
(or natural gas) in place
i.e., DEPk(t) at any point in time t is the index of estimated potential
reserves still left in sediments of the kt h geological type at time t ex-
pressed as a fraction of the total reserves originally in place. 6k may
then be expressed as a function of this index:
6k(t) = f(DEPk(t) (19)
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A reasonable postulate would be
6k(t) c + c 1 DEPk(t) (20)
where c and c are parameters to be estimated.
Finally, each production district as defined by the Federal Power
Commission might well contain more than one sub-population, and shifts in
drilling across populations might occur in response to changes in prices
of natural gas or oil. Since the data on size of discoveries are aggregated
by production districts, observed average size of discoveries might change
in response to price changes because of shifts from one sub-population to
another. For instance, if a given price change motivates explorers, on
the average, to increase the proportion of extensive drilling (i.e.,
drilling in high risk sub-populations which also have larger deposits),
the observed average size of discoveries aggregated over all the sub-
populations might actually show an increase.
The magnitude of such shifts in aggregate average size in response
to price changes would be positively related to the amount of new geologi-
cal knowledge received regarding deposits in the district, which in turn
has been conjectured to be proportional to the number of successful ex-
ploratory wells drilled in the region in the recent past.
Since the estimate of 6 occurs multiplicatively with the number
of successful wells drilled (WXS) in the estimating equations (15) and (17),
a natural way to capture the price effects on the aggregated average sizes
would be to use the specification 6 = f(DEP, PG, PO). Thus, the estimating
equation (L7) may now be modified to:
log(s(t + h)) = log(p(t)) + f(DEP, PG, PO) WXS[t; t + h] (21)
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where the function f( ) represents the mean decline rate 6 of discovery
sizes aggregated over an entire production district.
2.9 The Success Ratio
The discussion in the previous section is relevant conditional
upon an exploratory well striking oil or natural gas. In order to es-
timate expected returns and risks from an exploratory well before the
drilling begins, these figures must be modified to take into account the
probability that the exploratory well will result in a success. Postulate
III of Section 2.5 describes the behavior of success ratios as the play
evolves. The factor of proportionality between the probability of success
and the ratio in III is a constant for any given geological type, and may
be thought of as an index of difficulty of discovery of reservoirs in
that geological type once the play has started. It varies from one sub-
population to another (and one production district to another) depending
on the complex interaction of a number of geological variables.
Using postulates I, II and III (of Section 2.5) together, it can
be shown that once a play has begun, the probability of a success tends
to decrease monotonically throughout the evolution of the play in a pat-
tern similar to that derived for the average discovery size. This leads
us to specify the following type of relationship between probability of
success SR and average discovery size (s) within a given sub-population:
SR = al s/Rm a x (22)
where R is the estimated total reserves originally in place and a is
maxl index describing the difficulty of finding a reservoir in
a geological index describing the difficulty of finding a reservoir in
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this sub-population. Written in terms of the corresponding aggregate
variables SR and s for all the wells drilled in this sub-population,
SR = alS/R (23)
This says that as more exploratory drilling takes place in a
given sub-population, we expect to find proportional changes (declines)
in average discovery size and success ratio. Once again, to the extent
that we are forced to use size and success ratio data aggregated by pro-
duction district rather than by sub-population, we expect to see some
price effects on the mean success ratios reflecting shifts in the rela-
tive proportion of extensive and intensive drilling in response to price
changes. Combining this observation with the specifications in (21) and
(22), we expect a relationship of the form
log ( SR(t) = log ( s(t) ) + f'(PG,PO) (24)
SR(t0) s(t0)
where f' ( ) is a function of the current and/or lagged prices of oil
and natural gas. The observed price coefficients in the success ratio
equations (unlike the average size equations) would also reveal any
shifts in "directionality"l in response to changes in the relative prices.
"Directionality" is a term that became popular during and after
the Federal. Power Comnmission's Permian Area Rate Hearing. It refers to
the capability of the explorers to predict ahead of time if the well
will strike oil or gas conditional on its being a successful well. There
is empirical evidence (see, for example, Khazzoom (1968)) to support the
hypothesis of high directionality. A high directionality implies the
capability of an operator to conduct search, if he so desires, oriented
specifically for either oil or natural gas.
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For instance, if directionality is strong, a higher oil price might
result in an increase in the tendency to "drill for oil" rather than gas,
which in trn would increase the fraction of successful oil wells out of
total exploratory wells.
2.10 New Discoveries of Natural Gas and Oil
The size of discoveries per exploratory well SW is defined as
the product of the success ratio SR and the size of discovery conditional
on a success, S, i.e., SW = (SR)(s). It can be shown that under our
assumptions,
Var(SW) (Sw)2 , 4a (25)
where a is the variance of the distribution of s, the size per success-
ful well. This relation will later be used in computing the parameters
(RWG) and (RWO) of the exploratory wells equation (12).
Once the estimates of total exploratory wells drilled, fraction
of successful wells and average size of discovery per successful well are
known, new discoveries of natural gas and oil are simply given by
New total \ (fraction (average
discoverie = exploratory) x of x size of gas)
of gas wells gas wells wellsdiscoveries
f New total \ fraction average 
discoverie = exploratory) x of x size of oil
of oil wells oil wells discoveries/
2.11 Extensions and Revisions
Additions to oil and gas reserves can also occur as a result of
extensions and revisions of existing fields and pools. Extensions are ad-
justments to the estimates of proved recoverable reserves that result from
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changes in the estimates of the productive limits. Following the discovery
of a reservoir, a producer would normally drill additional wells (extension
as well as development wells) to delineate the productive limits of the
reservoir. In general a substantial portion of extensions are realized
within a year or two following the reservoir discovery. This provides the
following working hypothesis for the specification of the extensions
equation:
Extensions = gl (lagged discoveries, lagged exploratory wells) (28)
As the basin is depleted of the richer prospects, it is reason-
able to expect the size of extensions to drop. The index of accumulated
depletion DEP may therefore be added as an additional explanatory variable
on the right-hand side. However, it is likely that depletion effects on
extensions are already reflected in the functional relationship of (28)
through its effects on discoveries and exploratory wells. This is a mat-
ter to be resolved on the basis of empirical evidence from econometric
estimation. Similarly, an argument may be made to include the price of
natural gas (or oil) as an additional explanatory variable on the grounds
that incentive to gain more extensions is influenced by price expectations.
This too must be resolved empirically, since some price expectations are
already embedded in lagged discoveries and wells drilled.
Revisions are the least predictable category of reserve addi-
tions. They refer to adjustments in oil and natural gas reserves estimates
brought about by new geological and engineering information on reservoir
characteristics such as porosity, permeability and interstitial water.
Sometimes they also result from improved geological techniques of esti-
mating the sizes of previously known reservoirs. Finally, and unfor-
tunately, the American Gas Association and American Petroleum Institute
have-historically followed the convention of including negative extensions
in the category of revisions.
Needless to say, we do not expect to find too much of an eco-
nomic explanation for the observed size of revisions. Since the total
amount of proved recoverable reserves at the end of the previous year
represents the size of the reserves base susceptible for revision in any
given year, we expect this to serve as the main explanatory variable for
explaining revisions. Secondly, new information that leads to revisions
comes from exploratory drilling which makes lagged exploratory wells a
second candidate for explaining revisions. New information can also ar-
rive from new developmental drilling. Lagged incremental production of
natural gas (or oil) is therefore included as a third explanatory variable.
Finally, the index of exhaustion of the resource base DEP may be included
to capture depletion effects. The specification for the revisions equa-
tion is therefore of the form
/lagged lagged
Revisions = g2 year-end , exploratory , incremental, depletion (29)
reserves wells production index /
It is not expected that all of the variables on the right-hand side will
figure prominently, but a priori, year-end reserves is expected to have
a significant effect.
CHAPTER III
ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL
The discussion of Chapter II provides the basis for the speci-
fication of an econometric model to predict the supply of natural gas
and oil reserves in the Continental United States. Such a model will
now be formulated and estimated, with a goal to use it later for fore-
casting reserves under alternative economic and regulatory environments.
3.1 Structure of the Model
The overall structure of the model is shown schematically in
the block diagram of Figure 3.1. The dashed line on this diagram indi-
cates the boundaries of the model presented here. The inter-relation-
ships and neutral dependence among the various blocks are indicated by
the arrows. There is one block to represent each of the main categories
of additions to reserves viz. new discoveries, extensions and revisions
of oil and natural gas. New discoveries are computed by multiplying to-
gether the estimates of total'exploratory wells, success fractions and
average sizes of new discoveries conditional on success. Extensions and
revisions are estimated as functions of new discoveries, exploratory wells
and year-end reserves. As can be seen in the block diagram, additions
to gas reserves are formed from the sum of new discoveries, extensions,
and revisions, and, aside from changes in underground storage, the only
major subtraction from gas reserves occurs as a result of production.
Similarly, additions to oil reserves are the sum of new discoveries of
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oil, extensions, and revisions. Thus, to close the model of supply of
oil and natural gas reserves, we need estimates of the production out
of reserves. These are obtained from a separate model (in case of
natural gas) or by making a suitable assumption (in case of oil).
This chapter will therefore describe the steps in estimating a
set of nine equations that explain additions to reserves for natural gas
and oil. One equatiion is estimated to explain the total number of ex-
ploratory wells drilled (WXT), one equation each is estimated to explain
the average sizes of new discoveries per well of natural gas (SZG) and
oil (SZO), and one equation each is estimated to explain the fraction
of wells drilled that are successful in finding gas (SRG) and in finding
oil (SRO). Finally, four equations are estimated that explain extensions
of natural gas (XG), extensions of oil (XO), revisions of natural gas re-
serves (RG), and revisions of oil reserves (RO).
3.2 Variable Definitions and Data Sources
The variables used in estimating the model, together with the
sources of data and units of measurement, are listed below. The list is
arranged under four sub-groups, representing the four categories of
variables used.
WELLS Exploratory wells data are from the Joint Association Sur-
vey of Drilling Statistics, for 18 FPC (Federal Power Com-
mission) production districts, for the years 1963-1972.
WXT: Total number of exploratory wells drilled.
WXG: Number of successful exploratory gas wells.
48
Number of successful exploratory oil wells.
A time-average of WXT over the period 1963-1972.
Ratio of successful gas wells to total exploratory wells)
SRG = WXG/WXT.
Ratio of successful oil wells to total exploratory wells,
SRO = WXO/WXT.
Fitted values of the above two variables using the estimated
success ratio equations.
All data are from American Gas Association/American Petroleum
Institute/Canadian Petroleum Association, Reserves of Crude
Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas, for 18 FPC pro-
duction districts,- for the years 1964-1972. Units are
millions of cubic feet for natural gas, and thousands of
barrels for oil. Exceptions to this are explicitly stated.
Dummy variable for Louisiana South District.
Dummy variable for Permian District.
Dummy variable for Kansas, Oklahoma, TRRC Districts 1, 2,
3, 4, and 10.
Dummy variable for Colorado-Utah, and Wyoming Districts.
Total new discoveries of natural gas.
Total new discoveries of oil.
Total revisions of natural gas.
Total revisions of oil.
Total extensions of natural gas.
Total extensions of oil.
Natural gas extensions plus revisions, XRG = XG + RG.
WXO:
WXTM:
SRG:
SRO:
SRG, SRO:
RESERVES
DD1:
DD2:
DD3:
DD4:
DG:
DO:
RG:
RO:
XG:
XO:
XRG:
1Oil reserves data are available for twenty FPC districts, and
were used in the estimation of equations, whenever feasible.
YG:
YO:
SZG:
SZO:
A
SZG, SZO:
^ 2 ^ 2
aG , aO :
PGCG:
PGC 0:
DEPG:
DEPO:
PRODUCTION
QG:
QO:
CQG:
CQO:
Year-end reserves of natural gas.
Year-end reserves of oil.
Average size of gas discoveries per successful gas well,
SZG = DG/WXG.
Average size of oil discoveries per successful oil well,
SZO = DO/WXO.
Fitted values of the above two variables, obtained from the
estimated size of discovery equations.
Estimates of the variance over time of the size distributions
of gas and oil discoveries respectively. These are obtained
from the estimated size of discovery equations.
Estimate of the total potential gas reserves in each dis-
trict as of 1963. From Potential Supply of Natural Gas in
the U.S., published by the Potential Gas Association,
Mineral Resources Institute, 1971.
Estimate of the original oil-in-place in the district.
Index of depletion of the natural gas resource base in the
production districts, 1
DEPG = (PGCG - YG - CQG )/PGCG
Index of depletion of the oil resource base in the produc-
tion district, 1
DEPO = (PGC - YO - CQO )/PGC0
Data are from AGA/API/CPA, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural
Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas, for 18 FPC production districts,
for the years 1963-1972. Units are 106 cubic feet for gas
and 103 barrels for oil.
Total production of natural gas.
Total production of oil.
Cumulative production of natural gas,
t
CQG = E QGt,
t'= 1963
Cumulative production of oil,
t
CQO = E QOt
t'=1963
1See list of production variables for definition.
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PRICES AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES
PG:
PW or PG:
PO:
INTA:
ATCM:
New contract price-of interstate sales of gas at the well-
head, in cents per Mcf, by production district for 28 FPC
production districts, for the years 1952-1972. Compiled by
Foster Associates, Inc.
Average wellhead price, in cents per Mcf, by production
district for 18 FPC production districts, for the years
1962-1971, from Table F, FPC, Sales of Natural Gas.
Wellhead price of oil, in dollars per barrel, by production
district from 20 FPC production districts, for the years
1954-1972, from Bureau of Mines, Minerals Yearbook.
AAA bond interest rate (percent per annum), from Federal
Reserve Bulletin.
Index of average drilling costs for exploratory drilling
per well, by production district for 18 FPC production dis-
tricts, from AGA/API/CPA's Joint Association Survey. This
is a time average over the period 1963-1971.
Note that in all the estimations, new contract prices of natural
gas are used rather than average wellhead prices because they are likely
to represent much more closely the expectations with regard to future
prices on the part of the producers. No long term contracts analogous
to those between producers and the pipeline companies are written in
case of oil. That is, at least for purposes of our estimation, all sales
of crude oil at the wellhead may be considered to be at spot prices. Ac-
cordingly, the oil prices used in estimating the exploration and discovery
equations are the average wellhead prices.
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3.3 Modification of Theoretical Forms for
Purposes of Econometric Specification
Some of the theoretical relationships for the exploration and
discovery of natural gas and oil that were derived in Chapter II must
be modified for purposes of econometric estimation. We begin by re-
examining Equation (12) of Chapter II that defines the specifications
for the total number of exploratory wells drilled. Note that the equa-
tion includes the mean and variance of RWG and RWO, the average sizes
of gas discoveries and oil discoveries per well drilled. Using Equation
(25) of Chapter II we can write:
A--2 2 A2 A 2 2(1)
(RWG = 40G (RWG) = 4hG (SZG) (SRG) (1)
A2-2 A2 A 2 A 2(2(RWO= (RwO) = O(SZ0)2(SRO) (2)
A2 A2
where G and a0 are estimated values of the variances of the error
terms associated with the equations that determine the sizes of gas and
oil discoveries respectively.
Our theoretical specification for the number of exploratory
wells drilled also includes the expected prices at the field of natural
gas and oil. Since it is impossible to observe expected prices, we will
use as proxy variables a three-year moving average of past prices.
The theoretical specification also contains the mean values of
oil and gas discovery sizes, and we will use the estimated values of
these variables (obtained from the estimated forms of the size of dis-
covery equations) in our exploratory wells estimating equation. Finally,
dummy variables will be introduced (DD1, DD2, DD3, and DD4) to account
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for heterogeneity between broadly-defined field markets in the United
States. This gives us the following estimating equation for exploratory
wells drilled:
WXT =c + aDDl + a2DD2 + a3DD3 + a4DD4
A A
+ cl[SZG SRG)(PG_ + PG_2 + PG_3)/ 3
A A
+ (SZO SRO)(PO_l + PO_2 + P_3)/3]
+ c2[(SZG) (SRG) (PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3)/9
+ (o0 2/G2)(SZO) (SRO)2(PO 1 + P 2 + P0_3) /91
+ c3ATCM + c4INTA (3)
Note that this equation cannot be estimated until the size and success
ratio equations for both oil and gas have also been estimated, since the
equation includes the estimated values for sizes and success ratios, as
well-as the estimated error variances of the oil and gas size equations.
The theoretical specification for the average size of discovery
appears in Equation (21) of Chapter II, and it determines the average
discovery size at a point in time (t + h) given the average discovery
size at some previous time t. For purposes of estimation, we must choose
some interval of time (which we shall call the "reference period") for
which we can make observations of changes in discovery size. We will
use as a reference period for changes in discovery size the two-year in-
terval immediately preceding the middle of the previous year's observa-
tion. The reference value of discovery size will therefore be the average
of sizes over the past three years. We thus define:
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SZGREF = (SZG + SZG + SZG _)/3
and
SZOREF = (SZO_1+ SZ_2+ _3
for natural gas and oil respectively. Consistent with this, the appropri-
ate variable to be used in place of WXS[t; t + h] would be an index of
the number of successful wells drilled from the reference period through
the end of the previous year. The number of successful gas wells drilled
from the middle of the reference period to date can be approximated by
(1/2)WXG_3 + WXG_2 + (1/2)WXG_1 . We therefore define the following
indices proportioned for numerical convenience:
WXGREF = (WXG_1 + 2WXG_2 + WXG_3)/40 (6)
WXORE F = (WXO_1 + 2 WXO_2 + WXO_ )/40 (7)
Since the theoretical specification includes expected gas and
oil prices, we will again use three-year moving averages of these prices
as explanatory variables. This three-year moving average also corres-
ponds to the time interval between the reference point (middle of refer-
ence inkwell) and beginning of the current period. We thus obtain the
following estimating equations for the size of gas discoveries and size
of oil discoveries:
log(SZG) = log(SZG REF ) +
WXGREF · fl(DEPG_1, (PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3 )/3,
(PO + P0_2 + P0_3)/3) (8)
-3~~~~~~~~~8
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log(SZO) = log(SZOREF ) +
WREF · f2 (DEPO_l, (PG_1 + PG 2 + PG_3)/3,
(PO_1 + P_ 2 + P0_3)/3 (9)
The theoretical specification for the success ratio equations
appears in Equation (24) of Chapter II, and applying the same notion of
a reference period we obtain the following equations for the gas and oil
success ratios:
3 3
log(SRG) = logSRGRE F ) + WXGREF f3(1PGi, EPO ) (10)
3 3.
log(SRO) = log(SRO EF) + WXOREF f4(PG-i' -i) (11)
1 1
where SRGREF and SROREF are defined by
/A
SRGR = ((SRG + SRG 2 + SRG 3)/3) SZG (12)
REF
SROREF = ((SRO + SRO_ 2 + SR0_3)/3) (13)
R_2ZOREF
One problem with equations (12) and (13) is that they provide
no guarantee that the estimated success ratios will take on values be-
tween 0 and 1. In order to guarantee that we do not obtain success
ratios that are smaller than 0 or larger than 1, we will use the follow-
ing logit specification for our estimating equations:l
1To elaborate, referring to equations (10) and (11), the dependent
variable is by definition constrained to take only positive values where-
as the function on the right hand side is completely unconstrained.
There are econometric biases as well as simulation difficulties asso-
ciated with estimation of such equations directly. The logit form avoids
this difficulty by modifying the dependent variable into a form that is
not constrained. For small values of success fractions (say, <0.2),
log (SRG/(1-SRG)) should closely approximate log(SRG).
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lo SRG SRG REF 1 il l - SRG 1 - SRGREF + WXGREF ' f3 (EPG.i, EPO-i) (14)
log SRO] = log
- RO
3 3
RE' f4(.PG.-i .PO_i) (15)REF 1 1 1
It is important to stress that Equations (3), (8), (9), (14),
and (15) must be estimated in sequential order. First, the size equa-
tions (8) and-(9) are estimated and the resulting equations are used to
generate size estimates for the reference variables in the success ratio
equations. In addition, the estimated standard errors of the size equa-
A A
tions aG and a0 will be used in the estimation of the wells equation.
Equations (14) and (15) for the success ratios are estimated next, and
the results are used to generate estimated success ratios. Finally, the
wells equation can be estimated, using estimated sizes, estimated success
A 2 A2
ratios, and the estimated ratio of size variances (a02/G )
3.4 Estimation Method
All the equations in the model are estimated by using pooled
time series - cross-section data from eighteen Federal Power Commission
districts over the years 1964 to 1972. In choosing a time horizon, it
is important to choose a period over which the structure of the industry
and environment is reasonably stable. The regulation of the wellhead
prices of natural gas by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and the manda-
tory import quotas imposed on the U.S. crude oil market (beginning March,
1959) provided a period where price expectations were very stable.1
See, for example, evidence presented in Table 8-2 of E. Erickson
and R. Spann, "Price, Regulation and the Supply of Natural Gas in the
United States" [ 10 ].
56
Exploratory firms can therefore be assumed to act like price-takers
operating in a competitive market. However, FPC regulation of natural
gas prices did not become effective (i.e., no excess demand was observed
in reserves markets) for all the producing regions until 1964. Hence,
no data prior to 1964 was used in the case of natural gas. The crude
oil market was influenced by the secondary and tertiary effects of natural
gas regulation. In addition, the major producing states imposed restric-
tions -production of oil (withdrawal of proved reserves of oil) on the
producing companies. This, too, had an indirect influence on the supply
1
of o reserves. Since the production restrictions varied from year to
year, oil reserves data used in the estimation was restricted to even a
narrower time range of 1966 to 1972. To the extent that available geo-
physical information on the petroleum fields in the United States under-
went any significant change in the previous decade, estimation over the
shorter time period is likely to provide more relevant estimates of the
parameters. Table 3.1 summarizes the exact groupings of the production
districts as well as the time bounds used for estimating the different
equations in the model.
1For instance, it is alleged that the way these production re-
strictions were administered amounted to discrimination against large
discoveries in favor of small discoveries and against deeper wells
relative to shallower wells.
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Table 3.1
SUMMARY OF CROSS-SECTIONS AND TIME BOUNDS
FOR THE ESTIMATING EQUATIONS
DISTRICTS POOLED TIME BOUNDS
WELLS (WXT) 18 FPC DISTRICTS*
DISCOVERY SIZE FOR GAS (SZG)
SUCCESS RATIO FOR GAS (SRG)
EXTENSIONS FOR GAS (XG)
REVISIONS FOR GAS (RG)
It t .t 
i . t *
It .. IT *
1 TI T *
DISCOVERY SIZE FOR OIL (SZO)
SUCCESS RATIO FOR OIL (SRO)
EXTENSIONS FOR OIL (XO)
REVISIONS FOR OIL (RO)
II It It *
t i t . *
20 " it **
It it. t **
*These include Texas 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, California, Colorado + Utah,
Kansas, Louisiana North, Louisiana South (onshore), Mississippi, New
Mexico North, Permian (= New Mexico South + Texas 7C + Texas 8 + Texas 8A),
Oklahoma, West Virginia + Kentucky, Wyoming.
**These include the above eighteen plus Montana and Pennsylvania.
3.5 Econometric Procedures
In estimating the equations using least squares, attention must
be paid to the characteristics of the additive error terms assumed in
each of the equations. The appropriate econometric procedure to be used
will be a function of these characteristics. Consider an equation to be
estimated of the form:
Y.t 1= X + Xj + + Xjt ljt,1 2jt,2 k' + jt,n jt (16)
Let m = number of cross-sections
t = number of time periods
n = number of independent variables (ncluding constant term).
EQUATIONS
69-72
67-72
68-72
65-72
65-72
69-72
69-72
67-72
69-72
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Then (16) can be written in the matrix form:
Y = X + (17)
If the error terms .jt are all homoscedastic and uncorrelated
both across time and cross-sections, the covariance matrix will be of
the form:
= E[e '] = 2I (18)
But this would probably be an unreasonable assumption in our
case. In some cases there are theoretical reasons to expect the error
terms to have different variances for different districts. For example,
since the average size is computed as the mean of the sizes of several
independent new discoveries in a given time period, we would expect the
variance of the corresponding terms to vary inversely as the nuimber of
successful wells drilled in that period. Similarly, it is reasonable
to expect at least a first order autocorrelation across time in these
specifications. The reason behind this is usually related to the set of
omitted variables whose effect is expressed by the disturbance term Ejt.
Frequently many of these variables (especially economic variables) are
characterized by some inertia so that a large value this year is followed
by a large value next year. This leads us to expect a time-wise auto-
correlation in the error terms. We shall assume for simplicity that the
error terms are cross-sectionally independent. The specification of the
error terms may then be expressed by the following properties of the co--
variance matrix :
I
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2 2 (19)E(Cjt2) = t (19)
E(st , it) = 0 for j * i (20)
t PE it (21)
it = Pk j,t-1 t (21)t
where ut is serially uncorrelated. Since the omitted variables are
likely to be of the same nature for all the cross-sections, we shall
assume that the individual Pj do not differ significantly from each
other so that P can be replaced by p.
In the case of the average size and success ratio equations,
estimates of the relative values of o. can be derived from theoreticaljt
considerations. The heteroscedasticity in the error terms is thus
avoided by simply applying a weight of (1/ jt) to the observations of
Yit and Xjt,n in estimating equation (17) and then applying ordinary
least squares to the transformed equation, i.e., to the equation:
Y* = X* 8 + £* (22)
A
where Yt = Yt/Ijt (23)
X t,i Xjt, ... n) (24)
and EJt = jt/jt (25)jt jt t
To correct for the serial correlation, first an ordinary least
squares regression is performed on (22) and the residuals are used to
calculate an estimate of the first order serial correlation coefficient
given by :
/
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m t 'I ,
£ Cjt tl
= j=l t=2
m t 2
z Z ( l)
j=l t=2 j, t-
(26)
with ijt cjt
where is the mean of cit over all t and j. This can be shown to be
a consistent estimate of ? . We can now transform the variables auto-
regressively as:
Y Y P Y (27)
jt jt
£ = £ - P X (29)
sit = Ejt jtl- p E _9)
Ordinary least squares is then applied to the transformed equation
Y =X + (30)
to obtain unbiased, consistent and efficient estimates of the parameter
vector .
In the case of the exploratory well equation, no theoretical
A
estimates of ojt are available and so a slightly modified procedure is
used under the assumption that ojt are constant over time and vary only
across districts. This consists of a generalized least squares estimation
procedure2 involving three steps. First, an ordinary least squares
1See Theil [40], Section 6.3.
-This procedure was suggested by Robert S. Pindyck of the Sloan
School of Management, M.I.T.
i
regression is performed, and the residuals are used to calculate first-
order serial correlation coefficients for each district pooled in the
.sample. These coefficients are used to perform an autoregressive trans-
formation on the data, a second OLS regression.is performed, and the
resulting residuals are used to calculate estimated error term variances
for each district. Finally, these variances are used to perform a
weighted least squares regression. For a more complete and technical
description of this procedure, see MacAvoy and Pindyck [30. -
In the case of extensions and revisions equations, an auto-
regressive correction is applied as described earlier and ordinary least
squares is performed on the transformed equations. The step involving
the heteroscedasticity correction is omitted in view of certain data
considerations. Instead the geological dummies are expected to remove
most of the heteroscedasticity effect.
3.6 Statistical Results
3.6.1 Exploration and New Discoveries
The estimated versions of the five equations that de-
termine new discoveries of natural gas and oil are shown below, with
t-statistics in parentheses. Also listed for each equation are the
number of observations N, the R , F-statistic, standard error or re-
gression and the Durbin-Watson statistic.
I
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Exploratory Wells*
WXT = 796.16 - 20.74DD1 + 294.12DD2 - 1.49DD3 + 234.29DD4
(6.01) (-0.03) (2.61) (-0.02) (0.53)
A\ A
+ 0.00367[SZG SRG(PG_i + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(7.074)
A A
+ SZO-SRO ((P01 + P_2 + P0_3)/3]
-(2.04x10 - 8- 1.74xlO 8DD l*)[SG2 SRG2 ((PG_l1 + PG_2 + PG_3 )/3)
(-2.49) (0.51)
+0 · SzO2 S02 ' ((P0 1 + P0 2 + 3 )/ 3 )
2
G
- 0.00204ATCM - 64.15INTA_l1
(-1.36) (-5.85) (31)
2
N = 54 R = 0.81 F = 20.84
S.E. = 1.781 D.W. = 1.52
where
2 2 /
(S.E. of SZO regression) 2/(Average value of WXG)**
l oq2 =(S.E. of SZO regression) 2/(Averag e v a l u e o f WXO)
(5.46)2 1
(3.52)2 2.38 = 1.01
*An additional dummy variable is used for Louisiana South (onshore) on
the coefficient for the variance term . This is because the average
size of discoveries in this district is much higher then that in any of
the other production districts; the squared size term therefore falls
beyond the range of values over which (3) can be expected to hold without
any modification.
**Estimated error variances are divided by average values of the number
of successful gas and oil wells to account for the heterscedasticity cor-
rection used in the estimation of the size equations.
I
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Size of Gas Discoveries
(For Successful Gas Wells)
1 1 tSZG\
WXG SZG =
REF REF
-0.0717 + 0.02687DD1 + 0.0638DD2 + 0.03825DD3
(-1.21) (1.92) (1.53) (0.0255)
+ 0.1146DEPG_ + 0.00285 ((PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(1.60)
N 107
(1.21)
- 0.0241 ((P0_1 + PO_2 + P0_3)/3)
(-o.95)
2
R = 0.95
S.E. = 3.519
(32)
F = 295.6
D.W. = 1.68
where
SZGREF = size of gas discoveries in the reference period immediately
preceding the current period
= (SZG_1 + SZG2 + SZG_3)/3
WXGREF = index of number of successful gas wells completed in the
reference period immediately preceding the current period
= (WXG +2WXG + WXG _3)/40
-1 -2 _3
I
64
Size of Oil Discoveries
(For Successful Gas Wells)
WX log -0.08228 + 0.02074DD1 + 0.00464DD2 + 0.00233DDC
(-1.10) (1.22) (0.66) (0.37)
+ 0.02820DEP,1 - 0.00195 ((PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(0.35) (-2.08)
+ 0.02932 ((PO + PO + P0_3 )/3)(2.37) -1 -2 -3 (33)(33)(2.37)
N = 72 R = o.84 F = 55.92
S.E. = 5.46 D.W. = 1.68
where
SZOREF = size of oil discoveries in the reference period immediately
preceding the current period
= (SZO_1 + SZO_2 + SZO 3)/3
WXOREF = index of number of successful oil wells completed in the
district in the reference period immediately preceding the
current period
Since the variance of the discovery size averaged over n
independent discoveries is proportional to (1l/n), multiplicative weights
proportional to (WXGREF)/2 were applied in estimating (32). Similarly
weights proportional to (WXOREF)1/2 were used in estimating (33). UsingREF
the same logic, weights proportional to the square root of total explora-
tory wells drilled in the reference period in estimating the following
equations for the fractions of successful wells.
I
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Fraction of Successful Gas Wells
(SRG\log 1-SRGJ = SRGRE F
1SRGREF 
+ WXGREF [-0.04653 - 0.02706DD1 - 0.02502DD2
(-0.902) (-2.60) (-1.88)
- 0.02891DD3 
- 0.00312 ((PG_1
(-2.382) (-2.21)
)O R 2 = 0.76
S.E. = 4.32
SRGREF = ((SRG_1 + SRG_2
+ PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
+ 0.04384 ((PO_1+ P 2 + P_23)/3)]
(2.14)
... (34)
F = 55.59
D.W. = 1.61
SZG
+ SRG_3 )/3)SZGREF
Fraction of' Successful Oil Wells
l ( SRO )
SROREF 
log -SROREIF. + WXOREF [0.05521 + 0.02815DD1
(0.98) (1.09)
+ 0.02571DD2
(0.73)
+ 0.0138DD3+ 0.00208
(0.69)
((PG_1 + PG_2
(0.80)
+ PG_3)/3)
- 0.0378 ((PO_1 + PO_2 +
(-1.27)
2R = 0.43 F = 2.88
S.E. = 3.7
where
SROREF = ((SRO_i + SRO_2
D.W. = 1.48
A
+ SRO _3)/3) Z
SZOREF
where
N = 54
P0_3)/3)]
(35)
N = 
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The following observations can now be made about the
estimated equations. First, although some of the explanatory variables
are not significant at the 95% level, the signs of all of the coefficients
are consistent. For example, in equation (31) expected return per ex-
ploratory well appears with a positive coefficient while expected risk,
drilling costs, and the interest rate all appear with negative coeffi-
cients as expected.
Referring to the average size equations (32) and (33),
the constant term is negative in both cases, which means that on the
average, discovery size does decline as more successful wells are drilled
into it. This is a reflection of the "sampling without replacement" or
the "non-Bernoulli Urn" effect. Note also that the positive coefficients
of the index of accumulated depletion DEP in the site equations are also
correct, since this index decreases in size as depletion ensues. Finally,
in both the size equations and success ratio equations the price variables
for gas and oil appear with opposite signs, and this would be expected if
we believe that there is some directionality in oil and gas drilling.
The estimated equations provide us with some important
empirical results. First, the estimates of the constant terms in equa-
tions (32) and (33) can be used to compute the average rate of decline
in the size of new discoveries as drilling progresses. Some simple com-
putations will show that1 on the average, after filtering out the effects
1Consistent with the scale constant of (1/80) applied in the
definitions of WXGREF and WXOREF in (6) and (7), the estimated constant
term should be divided by 80 to give an estimate of percentage rate of
decline in the size per successful well drilled in the reference period.
I
of other economic and geological variables, size of new gas discoveries
from the next gas well drilled in a given district should be expected to
drop by nearly 0.09%. Similarly the size of oil discoveries are expected
to drop by 0.103% for each additional oil well drilled into the district.
This is not an insignificant rate of decline considering that more than
400 gas wells and 500 oil wells have been drilled in the United States
(i.e., about 20 gas wells and 25 oil wells in the "average" production
district) in the last reported year (1972).
Secondly, the estimations show that as field prices in-
crease additional drilling is done on the extensive margin. If price of
natural gas is increased, the size of gas discoveries per successful well
will increase (from equation (32)), while the success ratio for gas wells
will decrease (from equation (34)), indicating that additional drilling
is being done in regions with lower probabilities of success but higher
size of gas finds. Increases in the price of oil will also result in
additional drilling on the extensive margin, with the size of oil dis-
coveries increasing and the success ratio for oil wells decreasing. In
general, the net effect of moving to a more extensive margin is seen to
be an increase in the discoveries per exploratory well. That is, for in-
stance, when price of gas goes up, the average size of gas discoveries
increases more than enough to compensate for the decrease in success ratio.
I
1To see this, note that the values of SRGREF and SROREG go up in
proportion with SZGREF and SZOREF when prices are increased.
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Further, an increase in price of gas in the success ratio
for oil wells and a decrease in the size of oil discoveries. This indi-
cates that as gas becomes more profitable relative to oil, producers
shift to more extensive exploration for gas and more intensive exploration
for oil. This means that the new discoveries of oil per exploratory well
drilled will probably go down, but the total oil discoveries may never-
theless increase. This is because the total exploratory drilling increases
(from equation (31)) in response to the added economic incentive. Simi-
larly, an increase in the price of oil, while resulting in a large in-
crease in oil discoveries, will also probably result in some increase in
gas discoveries, since although there is a shift towards more extensive
oil drilling, the total amount of drilling has also increased so that we
can expect more gas to be discovered as well.
This symmetric behavior of gas and oil discovery sizes
in response may be contrasted with the empirical findings of Erickson
and Spann [ 11. Based on their estimations for the 1946 to 1959 period,
they conclude that increases in gas price increased the average size per
successful well of both gas and oil discoveries in that period. They
explained this phenomenon as arising out of a situation where even po-
tentially large gas prospects were shelved in the inventory of undrilled
prospects since gas discoveries were not marketable (in the absence of
pipeline connections). Over a period of time this led to the build-up
of an inventory of undrilled gas prospects whose average size (in B.T.U.
terms) was much larger than that of the oil prospects. When the con-
struction of large pipeline networks began in the fifties, they were
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willing to pay a premium for gas in large discoveries. These two facts,
combined with the lack of certainty as to whether a prospect is likely
to yield gas or oil, and a positive correlation between the chance of
finding a large oil discovery and that of finding a large gas discovery
caused the cross-elasticity of gas price on size of oil discoveries to
be positive. The negative cross-elasticity in our estimations may be
interpreted as evidence that the effects of inventory of gas prospects
discussed above are exhausted by the middle sixties. This must have been
a direct result of the advent of an integrated network of long-distance
pipelines which made natural gas just as marketable (if not more) as oil.
Alternative Estimations
Referring to the estimations in (32) and (33), it is seen
that the dummy variables for Louisiana South (DD1) and Permian (DD2)
appear with significantly positive signs in the two average size equa-
tions. This indicates that the average rate of decline in size per
successful well drilled is somewhat lower in these two districts relative
to the others. One possible reason for this might be that they are the
two largest production districts and, hence, have a proportionately much
larger nimber of reservoirs in the ground so that size does not decline
with continued drilling as steeply as for smaller districts. This sug-
gested the possibility of modifying the indices of successful wells
WXGREF and WXOREF to reflect differences (across districts) in the total
number of reservoirs in the ground. An index of the average amount of
exploratory activity in the district (WXTM) was thought to be a possible
I
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surrogate. Two new indices WXG' and WXOE are therefore defined:
REF REF
WXGEF = WXGREF/WXTM (36)
wxREF = WXOREF/WXTM (37)
The estimations in (32) to (35) were then repeated using these new in-
dices in place of WXG and WXOREF . The results of these estimationsREF REF
are presented in equations (38) to (41).
SZG
WXGRF log ) = -24.84 + 9.518DD1 + 1 4.461DD2
GREF , (-1.29) (1.582) (1.012)
+ 12.852DD3 + 29.995DEPG1
(1.610) (1.377
+ 0.887 ((PG_l + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(1.158)
- 6.052 ((P0_1 + PO_2 + P0_3)/3) (38)
(-o.684)
N = 107 R2 = 0.943 F = 279.3
S.E. = 3.5594 D.W. = 1.67
I
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l SZOREF/ (-1.715) (1.566) (0.305) (0.240)
+ 11.179 DEPO_1
(0.705)
- 0.865 ((PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(-2.258)
+ 13.96710 ((PO_1 + PO_2 + P0_3)/3)
(+2.319)
R2 = o.841
S.E. = 5.48
SRGREF
lo 1-SRG F
REF
2
R = 0.72
S.E. = 4.48
F = 57.466
D.W. = 1.51
+ WXGtREF * [25.731 - 6.105DD1
(1.868) (-1.030)
- 6.585DD2 - 6.621DD3
(-0.756) (-1.512)
- 0.677 ((PG_1 + PG_2 + PG_3)/3)
(-1.20)
- 1.316 ((P0_1 + P0_2 + P0_3)/3)]
(-0.367)
F = 45.67
D.W. = 1.64
1
WXOREF
(39)
N = 72
log (SRG[ i
N = 90
(40)
I
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log (SRO log ( SROEF + W [28. 043 + 14.339DD1
kl-SR0 x, 1-SRO RE REF
(1.118) (0.969)
+ 8.765DD2 + 3.249DD3
(0.505) (0.370)
+ 0.750 ((PG_1 +PG + PG_2 + 3)/3)
(0.717)
16.97 ((PO_1 + PO_2 + P0_3)/3)] (41)(-1.341)
2
N = 54 R = 0.38 F = 2.67
S.E. = 3.654 D.W. = 1.43
The results of these alternative estimations are not
satisfactory. Although the signs of the various coefficients are in
general the same as for the first set of estimations (except in the case
of coefficient of oil price in (40), their statistical significance is
much lower. This leads us to the conclusion that the heterogeneity
among districts with regard to the number of reservoirs is not very large
and can be adequately taken account of by the geological dummies of
equations (32) to (35). The results of these alternative estimations
are therefore rejected in favor of those in (32) to (35).
3.6.2 Extensions of Natural Gas and Oil
As we saw in Section 2.11, we would expect extensions of
both natural gas and oil to depend on lagged discoveries and the ntunber
of exploratory wells drilled in the previous years. The equations implied
by (28) of Chapter II were estimated in linear form using these explana-
tory variables, and the results are shown below.
I
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Natural Gas Extensions
XG = -38213 + 1.1307x10 DD1 + 1.9595x10 DD2 + 16080.9DD3 + 0.2942DG
(-C0.34) (2.72) (6.18) (0.11) (2.38)
+ 440.2WXT_(
(2.17)
2
N = 144 R = 0.44 F = 22.05
S.E. = 2.87x105 D.W. = 1.84
Oil Extensions
X = 4096.05 + 1.7852x105DD1 + 44092.7DD2 - 5192.72DD3 + 0.09243DO_1
(0.79) (10.31) (3.06) (-0.81) (+0.93)
+ 33.928WXT_l
(2.86) (3)
2
N = 120 R = 0.69 F = 50.80
4
S.E. = l.9x10 D.W. = 1.90
Alternative forms for these equations were estimated to
determine whether the depletion variables and prices would offer any
additional explanatory power. Alternative regression equations for ex-
tensions of' natural gas are shown below in equation (44), which includes
the index of accumulated depletion DEP and the year-end reserves YG, and
equation (45), which includes the gas price.
f
XG = 1.85x105 + 2.15x106DD1 + 2.16x106DD2 + 1.69x105DD3
(0.72) (2.40) (5.81) (0.91)
+ 0.315PG1 + 463.75WXT 1 - 2.7x105DEPG_1 - 0.015YG_1
(2.64) (2.41) (-0.74) (-1.25)
R = 0.45
S.E. = 2.73x105
(44)
F = 18.2
D.W. = 1.85
XG = 2.02x106 + 1.18x106 + 1.92x106 DD2 - 6412.ODD3
(0.64) (2.94) (5.76) (-0.04)
+ 0.289DG_1 + 409.OWXT _ 1.04x105DEPG 1- 8490.OPG_1
(2.41) (2.06) (-0.30) (-0.87)
R = 0.46
S.E. = 2.8x105
(45)
F = 17.5
D.W. = 1.82
Note that both the depletion variable and the price variable are statis-
tically insignificant and appear with the wrong signs. The year-end
reserves also has the unexpected negative sign.
Alternative estimations for extensions of oil reserves
are shown in equations (46) and (47) below.
I
N = 144
N = 144
XO =-15853.0 + 1.56x105 DD1 + 2989.6DD2 -
(-1.24) (8.58) (0.14)
+ 0.105DO_1 30.52WXT_l 21447.0DEPO_1
(1.02) (2.89) (1.31)
1
: 120 R = 0.76
S.E. = 1.88x104
XO = 337'43.0 + 1.85x105DD1 +
(1.38) (10.78)
+ 0.098D1 + 26.72WXT_
(0.95) (2.30)
2
120 R = 0.74
S.E. = l.9xlO
3593.9DD3
(-0.65)
+ 0.0065Y0_1
(2.44)
F = 51.4
D.W. = 1.81
45438.ODD2 - 2908.3DD3
(3.45) (-o.48)
+ 8065.0DEPo - 10748.0Po 1
(0.49) (-1.68)
F = 44.8
D.W. = 1.84
We see that the price variable appears with the wrong sign, and the
depletion variable is insignificant.
3.6.3 Revisions of Natural Gas
and Oil Reserves
As we saw in section 2.11, revisions of natural gas and
oil reserves tend to be rather erratic and difficult to explain and pre-
dict in an econometric framework. Equations are estimated for these
variables according to the specification in (29) of Chapter II. We ex-
pect that the explanatory variables would include past year-end reserves,
the number of exploratory wells drilled in the previous year, changes in
production, and the depletion index. When these equations were actually
estimated, it was found that the number of exploratory wells drilled did
i
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(46)
N =
N =
76
offer any explanatory power, although all of the other variables did.
The final regression equations, again estimated in linear form, are shown
below. No dummy variables are used in these estimations because it was
felt that there is no characteristic size for revisions in a particular
district.
Revisions of Natural Gas Reserves
RG = -712950 + 0. 02007YG_1 + 0.3142A(QG_l) + 930610DEPG
(-2.42) (3.21) (0.52) (2.07) (4)
2
N = 144 R = 0.14 F = 7.3
S.E. = 5x105 D.W. = 1.98
Revisions of Oil Reserves
RO = -133450+ 0.0483Y0_1 + 3.501A(QO_1) + 188210DEPOl
(-2.38) (5.80) (2.92) (2.33)
N = 72 R2 = 0.56 F = 28.3
S.E. = 1.02x105 D.W. = 1.75
Note that the equation for revisions of natural gas reserves has a rather
poor statistical fit, with an R of only 0.14. The results of (48)
could not be improved upon. We must simply recognize that natural gas
revisions are likely to provide a certain amount of noise in our simula-
tion results.
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CHAPTER IV
SIMULATION OF THE MODEL
The model estimated in Chapter III will now be tested for pre-
dictive validity over a historical period of simulation and lEter used to
predict the response over time of the supply of natural gas and oil re-
serves under alternative assumptions regarding the future economic and
regulatory environments. The predictions will then be used in conjunction
with existing models of production supplied out of known reserves and
wholesale demand of natural gas and oil to study the behavior of these
markets under the various assumptions. The results obtained are very
relevant to the current controversy over the field price regulation of
natural gas as well as the feasibility of "Project Independence" or
complete energy self-sufficiency of the United States by the end of the
decade.
Before we can proceed to these applications, certain additions
must be made to the model to facilitate policy simulations.
4.1 Additions to the Supply Model for Simulation Purposes
The nine estimated equations of Chapter III can be used to fore-
cast additions to proved reserves of natural gas and oil under alternative
assumptions. These additions modify the estimates of total proved re-
serves of gas and oil, i.e., reserves which can be committed by the pro-
ducers for sale to oil refineries or natural gas pipeline companies. The
accumulated amounts of proved reserves in the producing reservoirs limit
I
the quantities of oil and natural gas that can be supplied to buyers as
"production." The annual production supplied out of the reserves is
restricted (sometimes purely by technical efficiency considerations and
other times enforced by the various state regulatory agencies) to some
fixed percentage of proved reserves. Faster rates may reduce the eco-
nomic value of the remaining reserves by "channelling" or sealing off
parts of the reservoir. But up to that limit, more production in a
given period can take place, although the marginal costs of such incre-
mental production will be rising. This might be justified if prices
offered are higher. Thus, for both technical and economic reasons, the
supply of production out of reserves will be greater the larger the total
volume of proved reserves in the ground and the higher the prices of-
fered by the buyers at the field. Production supply should therefore be
modeled as a function of the well-head price and the quantity of proved
reserves.
Such a model has been constructed and verified by MacAvoy and
Pindyck [30] for the case of natural gas. We will use this model in
conjunction with the model for supply of proved reserves for purposes
of simulation. The task of building an analogous model for crude oil
production is a much harder one. It is complicated by the fact that
state regulatory agencies (the most well-known of them being the Texas
Railroad Commssion) have been periodically changing their production
I
1For more details of the model for production out of reserves,
see MacAvoy and Pindyck [29 , 30].
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restrictions, not for reasons of technical efficiency, but to maintain
a domestic price of crude oil that is most advantageous to their pro-
ducing states. State-imposed restrictions rather than other economic
considerations have often been the factor limiting oil production. In
the absence of a more satisfactory model in the literature to explain
supply of oil production, it will be assumed that production in the
future will be a constant fraction of the proved reserves. To reflect
the differences among the prevailing regulatory conditions in the dif-
ferent states, the inverse of the latest year's reserves-to-production
ratio in the production district is used as an estimate of this fraction
in the future years.
Secondly, a separate "sub-model" developed by Sussman [39] is
added to explain natural gas reserves additions and the production of
gas from reserves in off-shore Louisiana. Certain off-shore data that
is needed for the exploratory and discovery equations of Chapter III is
not available for the offshore region (e.g., successful exploratory
wells). Furthermore, offshore exploration and production depend partly
on variables unique to this region (e.g., the number of acres leased out
by the Federal Government and the number of off-shore drilling rigs
available). Thus, using a separate model for off-shore region not only
improves the specification of the model, but permits us to examine the
'When simulating over a historical period of simulation, this
assumption is removed and the actually observed values of crude oil
production is used as an exogeneous input to the model for reserves
additions.
I
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the effect of an additional policy variable; namely, the acreage of off-
shore lands leased out every year to explorers. The Sussman model pre-
dicts the number of wildcats drilled in offshore land and the new dis-
coveries of natural gas for wildcats which together yield an estimate
of new gas discoveries. Extensions and revisions of natural gas are
then modeled as functions of lagged discoveries and field wells.1'2
1For a more detailed exposition of this sub-model, see P. N.
Sussman, "Supply and Production of Offshore Gas Under Alternative
Leasing Policies," Master's thesis submitted to Sloan School of Manage-
ment, M.I.T., June, 1974.
2The Sussman model does not predict the addition to reserves of
oil from off-shore because of non-availability of some of the required
data in case of oil. However, oil tends to occur in reservoirs at much
smaller depths than natural gas. The characteristics of an off-shore
reservoir are much closer to those in the adjacent on-shore region if
it it happens to be an oil reservoir rather than a gas reservoir.
Hence, the estimates obtained for the discoveries of oil per exploratory
well in on-shore Louisiana South are assumed to hold for the off-shore
district as well.
The number of exploratory wells in the off-shore region are
then estimated as a constant factor times the number of wildcats as
estimated by the Sussman model. The value of the multiplicative factor
is estimated on the basis of the most recent historical data. Finally,
the new discoveries of oil from the entire Louisiana South district
(on-shore and off-shore) are computed by multiplying the total ex-
ploratory wells in the district with the average size and fraction of
successful wells.
Extensions and revisions are then estimated using (42) and
(48) of Chapter III as in the case of other districts. The procedure
admittedly involves an approximation, but fared quite satisfactorily
when applied over a historical period simulation. In any case, oil
discoveries are much less significant than gas discoveries in the
off-shore region.
Finally, two accounting equations of the following form (one
each for natural gas and oil) are added to close the model for reserves
and production:
fYear-end (Year-end New
Reserve Reserves Discoverietensio
+ (Revisions; + (Production
4.2 Simulation of the Model Over
An Historical Time Period
The model is first used to predict the response of reserves
and production supply over an historic period of time. This will help
as judge the predictive validity of the model and apply suitable correc-
tions if necessary. For instance, if this simulation revealed an in-
creasingly upward bias in discoveries, this can be taken into account
when predictions for the future are interpreted.
Tables 4.1 to 4.7 report the results of the simulation over the
period 1967-1972. In addition to the simulated, actual values and the
errors for each variable, the mean and root-mean-square (RMS) simulation
errors are presented in these tables.
The predicted number of total exploratory wells is quite close
to the actual values with a mean error of about 5% of the mean number
of wells over the period (see Table 5.1). The mean errors of successful
oil and gas wells are approximately 11.5% and 20% of the corresponding
averages. These may appear relatively large, but as we have seen earlier,
some amount of chance variation in the fraction of success and average
size of discoveries must be expected due to geological uncertainty.
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Simulated gas wells tend to be lower than their actual numbers
towards the end of the simulation period, indicating a greater predicted
proportion of extensive drilling than was actually observed. However,
the structure of the model is such that errors in the success fraction
arising from observational errors in economic variables are in part can-
celled by corresponding errors in the average size of discovery, thus
yielding an estimate of new discoveries that is less sensitive to random
observational errors. For example, if the observed gas price is larger
than the true price to which producers react, an unduly large shift to-
wards extensive drilling will be predicted, i.e., the predicted fraction
of successful gas wells will be too low and the predicted average size
of discovery too high The percentage errors in the predicted new dis-
coveries will probably be less than either of the above two errors.
This is what we see from the simulation results for total new discoveries
(Table 4.2). The simulated new discoveries of natural gas do not reveal
any significant under-predictions towards the end of the period. The
predicted new discoveries of gas in 1968 and 1969 are actually too high,
but this appears to be due to a rather unusual drop in discoveries that can-
not be explained by smoothly.varying economic or geological variables.
Note that the model tracks the extensions and revisions of oil
much more accurately than those of natural gas over the historic period
of simulation (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). it is possible to explain this
finding in terms of producers' anticipations of future natural gas prices.
By about 1968, the first signs of a natural gas shortage to consumers be-
gan to show. Indication of a disequilibrium condition in the market for
I
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reserves led many producing companies to anticipate a review and upward
revision of the natural gas ceiling prices.
A natural reaction of a producing company to this set of cir-
cumstances would be to search less keenly for extensions as well as to
adopt somewhat more conservative procedures for estimating the sizes of
proved reserves. This does not necessarily imply a deliberate attempt
by the producers to mislead the public. For example, since proved re-
serves are by definition the amount of natural gas that can profitably
be produced from a reservoir "at the existing economic and operating
conditions" [3], producing companies facing restrictive price regulation
can quite legitimately base their estimates of proved recoverable re-
serves on the prevailing artificially low prices. Thus, part of the
explanation behind the overly conservative estimates by the industry of
natural gas extensions and revisions might be the uncertainties generated
by the regulatory process itself. Since the definitions of the different
categories of reserves additions are ambiguous, other possibilities of
misclassifying reserves present themselves as well.
In any case, if it is true that industry estimates of extensions
and revisions tend to be more conservative under a restrictive regulatory
policy, we would expect these categories of reserves additions to in-
crease more than proportionately (relative to new discoveries) if and
when regulation is liberalized.
The predicted supplies of natural gas production for the his-
torical period are shown in Table 4.7. Although total reserves additions
(in Table 4.5) of natural gas are somewhat overestimated by the model,
no significant over-prediction of production supply is observed. This is
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understandable because production supply is a function of year-end reserves.
There are long lags built into the process of development; hence, a per-
centage change in reserves additions is fully translated into a corres-
ponding change in production supply only after several years.
Judged on the whole, the results of the historical simulation
are quite satisfactory. Although the predicted additions to reserves
of natural gas do not track the actual values as closely as those of
oil, the deviations can be explained in terms of the producers' reaction
to regulatory uncertainties.
Finally, results of an additional "experiment" conducted by
MacAvoy and PindyckI for the historical period (1967-1972) are of some
interest in evaluating the behavior of reserves additions in the past.
They sed the supply model to evaluate the impact of the restrictive
regulatory policies during 1967-1972 on reserves additions of natural
gas and compared it with the reserves additions that ould have been
achieved in the absence of field price regulation. The latter condition
was simulated by using hypothetical "unregulated prices," chosen such
that a reserves to production ratio of 15 to 1 (the lowest ratio actually
experienced in the early and middle 1960's) is maintained. 2 The results
1See Chapter 5 of [30] for more detail.
If it can be assumed that demands for reserve backing by final
consumers was constant throughout the decade, this ratio is the lowest
in keeping with equilibrium of demand and supplies of reserves as well
as production throughout the period.
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of these simulations are shown in Table 4.8. The simulated total addi-
tions to reserves, at regulated prices on new contracts ranging from 17
to 31 cents per Mcf, declined over the period from 17 trillion cubic feet
in 1967 to 15 trillion cubic feet in 1972 (with a low of 14 in 1971).
In contrast, the hypothetical "unregulated" prices would have maintained
reserve additions at 16 to 19 trillion cubic feet. This illustrates
clearly the process through which the field price regulation of natural
gas led to progressively lower reserves-to-production ratios (see Fig.
4.9).
4.3 Simulation of Supply Response to Future
Economic and Regulatory Environments
The chief utility of the model developed in this thesis is to
help evaluate relevant future policy alternatives. The model can be used
to study the response of exploratory activity and the resulting additions
to reserves to alternative regulatory policies and economic environments.
Combined with models of demand for oil and natural gas, it can help us
analyze the behavior of oil and gas markets under various assumptions.
The current controversy over what natural gas regulatory policy is
to be used over the rest of the decade provides an ideal opportunity for
such an application. It is widely believed that low wellhead ceiling
prices over the past decade have led to the beginning of a shortage in
natural gas production. If the demand for gas grows as expected during
the 1970's, and if ceiling prices remain low as a result of restrictive
regulatory policy, this shortage could grow significantly.
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The policy question we wish to answer is whether or not-shortages
of natural gas can be ameliorated by suitably increasing the field prices
in the future. Closely related to this are the questions posed by
"Project Independence": What prices of domestic fuels would be necessary
to generate enough additional fossil fuels to satisfy demands in domestic
energy markets by 1980? Is the current international oil price set by
the oil-producing countries high enough to extract domestically available
oil and gas reserves efficiently? Or, does it require use of some
tariffs or quotas?
The model developed here of the supply of oil and natural gas
reserves is used in conjunction with an existing model of the other
sectors of the natural gas industry to address some of these questions.
4.3.1 Regulatory Policy Alternatives
for Natural Gas
A large number of alternative proposals have been made
under the general heading of "deregulation of field prices" of natural
gas. There is hardly a unanimity among experts as to whether deregula-
tion is a good idea and, if so, how and over what time period it should
occur. Suggested courses of action have included a complete and in-
stantaneous deregulation at one extreme and a virtual price freeze (ex-
cept for passing on increases in costs of production) on the other.
Proposals for deregulation are based on the argument
that FPC rulings have restricted price increases, even though cost in-
creases have reduced supplies at the same time and demand has increased.
Thus, decontrol would allow higher prices which would clear the market of
I
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excess demand and would be an inducement to take on increased exploration
and, hence, add to reserve supply. Most of the practicable deregulation
proposals contain a provision for some national ceiling imposed to avoid
adverse inflationary consequences. The White House proposal--outlined
in President Nixon's Energy Message of April 1973--falls under this
category of gradual deregulation.
At the other extreme are the proposals to put stronger
controls on well-head contracts and allow prices on the basis of histori-
cal average costs of exploration and development. Future increases in
prices would be limited to increases in average costs of production.
The draft bills proposed by the staff of the Senate Interior and Commerce
Committee are of this type. The argument behind these proposals seems
to be that producers have been holding back reserves in anticipation of
relaxed price controls--and tighter controls would cause them to see the
futility of holding back.
There are many proposals for regulation that lie somewhere
between these two categories of proposals. The rulings of the Federal
Power Commission in recent years (1970 to 1974) have allowed price in-
creases to follow one such "middle course." They are based on a philosophy
of continued regulatory controls of the field prices while allowing price
increases somewhat higher than the increase in average costs.
MacAvoy and Pindyck [30] have characterized these three
categories of proposals by specific alternatives called "Cost of Service"
regulation (most restrictive), "Phased Deregulation" (least restrictive)
and "Status Quo" regulation (a middle course such as the current FPC policy).
1The most frequently mentioned ceiling is one that limits the increase
I on the level of wholesale price of gas by 1980 to 10%.
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These three specific alternatives are investigated by
inserting the proposed policies into the econometric model developed in
this thesis. To examine how the supplies of reserves interact with the
other sectors of the natural gas and oil industry, the policy simulations
are carried out after combining the model with the MacAvoy-Pindyck [30]
model which explains the production supply out of reserves, the pipeline
mark-ups and the wholesale demand for natural gas.
4.3.2 Values of Exogeneous Variables
The new contract well-head prices of natural gas are as-
sumed to be increased by 5 in each of the years 1973 and 1974. These
estimates reflect the decisions of the Federal Power Commission in the
last two years. Under "Cost of Service" regulation, price increases on
new contracts in the subsequent years are limited to 3 per Mcf per
annum (in each of the production districts), corresponding to the esti-
mated rate of growth of average total costs per Mcf in the last four
years. The "Status Quo" regulation alternative consists of the Federal
Power Commission continuing its 1970-1974 policy of allowing price in-
creases of up to 5 per Mcf per year. The upper bound of 5 price in-
crement is used for the simulation of this alternative. The "Phased
Deregulation" alternative seeks to allow price increases that would ap-
proximate market-clearing prices toward the end of the decade. Under
this policy, it is assumed that a 250 per Mcf increase will be allowed
in 1975 on new contract prices followed by annual increments of 5 per
Mcf until 1980. Table 4.9(a) summarizes the U.S. averages of the new
I
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Table 4.9(a): New Contract Prices of Natural Gas at the Well-head Under
Alternative Regulatory Policies (in Cents/Mcf. )*
Year Cost of Service
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
31.6593
34.6665
39.7461
42.787
45.8663
48.9452
52.0439
55.1431
58.2327
Status Quo
31.6593
34.6665
39.7461
44.7769
49.845
54.9127
60.0079
65.1115
70.2117
Phased Deregulation
31.6593
34.6665
39.7461
64.675
69.7266
74.8014
79.9566
85.1464
90.3358
Table 4.9(b): Well-head Prices of Crude Oil Under Alternative Oil Price
Scenarios, $/Barrel (in equivalent 1974 Dollars)
Year "Low" "Medium" "High"
1974 6.50 6.50 6.50
1975 6.25 6.50 6.65
1976 6.00 6.50 6.80
1977 5.75 6.50 6.95
1978 5.50 6.50 7.10
1979 5.25 6.50 7.30
1980 5.00 6.50 7.50
*Averages for the United States.
I
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contract prices under the three alternative regulatory policies.
Well-head oil prices are assumed to stay constant in
real terms at the $6.50/barrel price observed in 1974, i.e., future
price increases in oil are expected to exactly match the inflation
index. This corresponds to the scenario of "medium" oil prices shown
in Table 4.9(b). Based on the Data Resources Quarterly Econometric Model
forecast for the period 1972-1980, the G.N.P. per capita is expected to
grow at 4.2% in real terms. The rate of inflation is assumed to be
6.5% per annum as forecasted by the Thurow-Ripley Long Term Econometric
Model.
It is assumed that the Federal Government will follow a
policy of leasing 2 million acres of off-shore lands every year until
1980.2
1Prices in the individual production districts are weighted by
the respective amounts of production to compute this U.S. average. These
figures are therefore obtained as part of the output of the simulation
output.
2The Department of the Interior is actually considering leasing
much larger acreages of off-shore lands every year in an effort to
encourage exploration rapidly. A figure of 3 to 10 million acres per
year is mentioned in this respect. However, the off-shore drilling
activity is limited by the available number of drilling rigs. It is
believed on the basis of the current industry capacity and the lag
times required to build the rigs that a 2 million acres leasing policy
would reflect more accurately the maximum feasible amount of off-shore
exploration in the next five or six years.
I
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The demand side of the MacAvoy-Pindyck model requires
exogeneous inputs of other economic variables. The most important of
·them are population growth, which is assumed to remain constant at 1.1
percent per annum, the value added in manufacturing which is assumed to
grow at 4.2% per annum and capital additions which are also projected
to grow at 4.2% per year.
4.3.3 Results of the Simulation of Alternative
Regulatory Policies and Economic Environments: Natural Gas
Tables 4.10 to 4.15 show the forecasts obtained from
the simulations of the three alternative regulatory policies. Note that
the results of the three policies do not start to deviate from each
other until 1976 because the assumed values of exogeneous variables in
1973 and 1974 are identical for the three policies. In addition, there
is a one-year lag before exploration and discoveries respond to changes
in exogeneous variables.
Let us first consider the impact of the alternative
policies on supply of natural gas reserves and production. These are
shown in Tables 4.10 to 4.12. The most restrictive regulation repre-
sented by "Cost of Service" (Table 4.10) is expected to increase new
discoveries rather slowly from 10 trillion cubic feet in 1973 to approxi-
mately 15 trillion cubic feet in 1980. Much of the increased exploratory
activity responsible for this increase is probably attributable to the
relatively high oil prices. Total additions to reserves would also grow
slowly, but they are in the range of 20 to 25 trillion cubic feet per
year. Production supplied out of the reserves, however, would increase
I
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from nearly 24 trillion cubic feet to more than 30 trillion cubic feet
by the end of 1980. The increased production comes partly from the
existing reserves base as of 1973, thus reducing the total reserves
base from 230 to 217 trillion cubic feet and the reserves-to-production
ratio from 10 to about 8 by 1980. In spite of consistently producing
more natural gas than the total additions to reserves, the production
supplied cannot meet the demands. Demands are quite high (41 trillion
cubic feet) by the end of 1980 because of a combination of low gas price
and high oil price. The sizes of unsatisfied demands would be very sub-
stantial, amounting to more than 25% of the total demands by 1980.
The situation would improve slightly if "Status Quo"
regulation is used. The total increments to proved reserves are not
large enough to match the production supplied in the past few years but
they match production towards the end of the simulatio nperiod. The
total stock of reserves in 1980 (230 trillion cubic feet) is roughly
equal to that at the beginning of the simulation period. However, since
production is increasing, the reserves-to-production ratio falls from
10 to less than 8. With the higher wholesale prices of natural gas,
the demands for production are less than those in the "Cost of Service"
case; but they still exceed the production supply by substantial amounts
causing shortages of the order of 8 trillion cubic feet by 1980.
The excess demands would be cut down to nearly zero in
case the "Phased Deregulation" policy is adopted, both because the demand
is cut down (to about 35 trillion cubic feet in 1980 compared to 40
trillion cubic feet for the "Status Quo" case) and supply out of reserves
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is increased (to 35 trillion cubic feet in 1980 as against 31.5 trillion
in case of "Status Quo" regulation). The shortages in production are
eliminated by the end of the seven-year period. The additions to reserves
exceed supply of production by the end of the period indicating that
shortages in reserves markets also are eliminated.
The response patterns of the additions to natural gas
reserves are plotted in Figure 4.3. Notice that the additions
to reserves begin to show a decline by 1980 in all the three cases.
This may be interpreted as evidence of the depletion of resource base.
With a finite resource base and a "sampling without replacement" effect,
the returns from further drilling begin to show a significant decline.
This, in turn, reduces the incentive to further drilling. Additional
price increments would be required at this time if the level of explora-
tory activity and rate of increase of reserves additions is to be main-
tained.
The simulation results provide us an opportunity to com-
pute estimates of price elasticities on new discoveries and total reserves
additions. For example, to compute the elasticity of new discoveries of
1 Since our model has a recursive structure with many non-linear
structural equations, elasticities are hard to compute directly from
the econometric estimations. For example, a shift in the price of gas
has a direct effect on the amount of total exploratory drilling (because
of the change in dollar returns expected) as well as an indirect effect
through its influence on the quality of reservoirs discovered, i.e.,
through its influence on the size of discovery and probability of success.
In addition, the variance of dollar returns is affected by a price change
and, in turn, influences the exploratory wells drilled. The net effect
of a price change on the amount of new discoveries is a composite of all
these influences. Price elasticities under this structure are therefore
far easier to compute from simulation results than from the econometric
estimations.
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natural gas with respect to price of natural gas, we can observe the
percentage difference in some future year between the new discoveries
generated by the "Cost of Service" and "Deregulation" alternatives. The
required om-price elasticity will then be equal to the ratio of this
percentage to the corresponding percentage difference in the prices al-
lowed under the two alternatives. Since the specifications do not con-
strain the elasticities to be constant, we expect to find the estimates
of elasticities varying, depending on the levels of the endogeneous and
exogeneous variables. Based on such a computation for the production
districts in the Continental United States excluding off-shore Louisiana,
the elasticity of new discoveries of natural gas with respect to gas price
by the 1978-1980 period was found to be in the range of 0.25 to 0.30.1
This is considerably smaller than the elasticities reported in earlier
studies such as Erickson and Spann [11], Spann and Erickson [38], and
Khazzoom [23].2 The elasticity estimates computed for the latest year of
the simulation (1980) tend to be even lower as depletion of these resource
bases begins to significantly affect the returns from drilling.
1The value would be higher if the off-shore region is also in-
cluded, probably because it is still a relatively unexplored area and
contains large promise for the future.
In their study published in 1971 1 ], Erickson and Spann re-
ported an own-price elasticity of gas discoveries of 0.69. Their later
study [38 ] using more recent data and a regression constrained to obey
certain cross-elasticity conditions showed a price elasticity of 3.1.
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It should be interesting to observe the corresponding
cross-price elasticity also, i.e., elasticity of gas discoveries with
respect to oil price. To do this, simulations under the "Status-Quo"
and "Phased Deregulation" alternatives are repeated at two other oil
price "scenarios," called "low" and "high" oil prices in Table 4.9(b).
Under the "low" condition, the price of oil per barrel is assumed to
fall linearly from its 1974 level of $6.50 to $5.00 in equivalent 1974
dollars by 1980. Under "high" oil prices, it is assumed to increase
(linearly) from $6.50 in 1974 to $7.50 in equivalent 1974 dollars by
1980. The results of these simulations are presented along with those
for "medium" oil prices in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. Once again the estimates
of cross-elasticities computed from these results vary somewhat depending
on which set of policy alternatives is used in computing them. However,
all the estimates of cross-elasticity of new discoveries of gas with
respect to oil price are negative, and fall in the rarge -0.15 to -0.25.
This empirical finding contradicts a view of the oil and gas discovery
process that was often voiced during the discussions on U.S. oil import
controls. Under this view, it was claimed that liberalizing the oil im-
port quota system sufficiently to cause the U.S. price of oil to fall
would aggravate the shortage of natural gas caused by the ceilings on the
well-head price of natural gas. Such an argument presupposes that the
1This view of the oil and gas discovery process contributed to
the objections raised in the minority report of the Cabinet Task Force
on Oil Import Control. See the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control,
The Oil Import Question [ 7] for a discussion of the oil import problem.
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cross-elasticity of supply between oil and gas discoveries is positive
1
and dominates any positive cross-elasticity of demand. The small abso-
lute value of the estimated elasticity lends some credence to the Spann-
Erickson hypothesis of zero cross-elasticity of supply between oil and
2,3
gas discoveries.2' 3 The negative cross-elasticity implies that although
total exploratory drilling may respond positively to increases in oil
price, this effect on new discoveries of natural gas is more than offset
1The possibility of positive supply interdependence was also
raised in a submission to the Cabinet Task Force by Richard S. Gonzales
in which Gonzales questioned the analysis of Burrows and Domencich pre-
sented in U.S. Oil Import Policy [6 ]. These contentions were based
on casual evidence rather than a rigorous empirical study.
2Based on a theory of joint costs in oil and gas exploration,
Spann and Erickson derive some constraints that must be satisfied by
the own-price and cross-price elasticities of oil and gas discoveries.
They test their hypothesis of zero cross-elasticity by running re-
gressions under these constraints and concluded that the hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
3Note also that no constraints such as those incorporated by
Spann and Erickson (S-E) are required in estimations of the theoretical
model of Chapters II and III. This is because our theoretical formu-
lation model exploratory wells in terms of the size of dollar returns
for exploratory wells (rather than as a simple function of prices) and,
hence, automatically incorporates the kind of constraints S-E are in-
terested in. Further, note that the constraints in price elasticities
derived by S-E hold only under certainty. They must be modified if
geological uncertainty is taken into account. Our model in fact auto-
matically incorporates these modified constraints through its theo-
retical structure, because explorers are assumed to react to dollar
returns corrected for risk.
6
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by the directional drilling for oil. In other words, the "substitution"
effect of the price change dominates the "scale" effect. Thus it also
provides an indirect support to Khazzoom's finding [22] of high di-
rectionality.
The own-price and cross-price elasticities of total ad-
ditions to natural gas reserves also can be similarly computed from the
simulation results. These computations revealed an own-price elasticity
of approximately 0.8 and a cross-price elasticity (elasticity with
respect to oil price) in the range 0.0 to +0.08. This means that when
prices of gas are increased, the total additions to gas reserves increase
at a faster rate than new discoveries of gas. This is not unreasonable
because the information generated from exploratory well drilling and
the finding of new reservoirs subsequently paves the way later to ex-
tensions and revisions which are also components of reserves additions.
It is interesting to note that the cross-elasticity shifted from negative
in the case of new discoveries to zero or very slightly positive in the
case of total reserves additions. Once again, this means that extensions
and revisions of natural gas increase as a result of the increased total
exploratory drilling. In fact, they increase enough to compensate com-
pletely for the negative cross-elasticity of new discoveries.
Thus, on the whole, even though new discoveries of gas
show a decline at higher oil prices, the total additions to natural gas
reserves are relatively insensitive to the price of oil. This is clearly
evident from the results presented in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. Production
supply is also unchanged because it depends only on year-end reserves of
.
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gas and the price of gas. Hence, the production and reserves markets
would clear (or almost clear) under the "Phased Deregulation" alterna-
tive irrespective of whether oil prices are "low," "medium" or "high."
The magnitudes of shortages in the case of "Cost of Service" and "Status
Quo" regulatory alternatives remain about the same for all three sets
of oil prices.
4.3.4 Results of the Simulations of
the Supply of Oil Reserves and Production
We can now examine more closely the impact of alterna-
tive regulatory policies and oil price levels on the supply of additions
to oil reserves and the resulting production. Tables 4.13 to 4.15 show
the additions to oil reserves under the assumption of "medium" oil prices
and the three regulatory alternatives for natural gas. The sensitivity
of the reserves additions to changes in oil price can be judged from the
results shown in Tables 4.18 and 4.19. These tables compare the reserves
additions for "low," "medium" and "high" oil prices. The own-price and
cross-price elasticities of new discoveries and total additions to oil
reserves can now be computed in the case of natural gas.
The estimated own-price elasticities of new discoveries
and total additions to reserves of oil lie respectively in the ranges
0.25 to 0.35 and 0.10 to 0.20. These may be compared with the lower-
price elasticity of 0.87 reported by Spann and Erickson [38] for oil dis-
coveries. The cross-elasticity with respect to price of gas are com-
puted to be -0.10 to -0.25 for new discoveries of oil and 0.0 to -0.06
for total additions to oil reserves. The negative cross-elasticity in
9
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the case of new discoveries indicates once again that the directional
drilling effect dominates the scale effect. However, as in the case of
natural gas, this effect is almost entirely compensated by the positive
response of extensions and revisions of oil to total exploratory activity,
thus yielding a cross-elasticity of total additions to reserves very
close to zero. In any event, these results seem to cast considerable
doubt on policy arguments resting on the assertion that oil discoveries
are highly sensitive to economic factors.
In interpreting the size of supplies of oil reserves and
production, two things must be kept in mind. First, some important oil
production districts within the Continental United States are not in-
cluded in the model for reserve additions because of unavailability of
some of the required data. To correct for this and get an estimate of
the total supply of production in the United States, a multiplicative
factor of 1.22 is applied to the figures of oil production appearing
in the last columns of Tables 4.13, 4.14, 4.15, 4.18 and 4.19.1 Secondly,
reserves and production from Alaska are not included in the figures re-
ported in Tables 4.9 to 4.19. Alaska is a much more important factor2
in the case of oil than in the case of natural gas. Under "medium" oil
1The factor 1.22 is obtained as the historical average of the
same ratio.
2The AGA/API estimates show that more than 10 billion barrels
or nearly 27% of the total estimated oil reserves in the U.S.A. lie in
Alaska. By comparison, Alaska has only about 12% of the total proved
reserves of natural gas in tne U.S.A.
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prices and "Status Quo" regulation of natural gas, domestic production
of oil is expected to go down from its 1972 level of 3.4 billion barrels
per year (or - 9.3 million barrels per day) to 2.76 billion barrels per
year (or 7.65 million barrels per day) by 1980. Additions to reserves
of crude oil would go up by approximately 25% from its 1974 levels, but
these would still fall short of the production supplied by as much as
15% (corrected total additions to reserves of oil are expected to be
approximately 2.30 billion barrels per year). Because of the low price
elasticities, the total additions to reserves and production are not
much higher even when "high" oil prices are simulated. The estimated
total additions to reserves in the "high" oil price case are about 2.35
billion barrels per year and the corresponding production (assuming a
reserves-to-production ratio of 9 to 1) is expected to be 2.9 billion
barrels/year (or 7.8 million barrels per day).2 These estimates may be
compared with the Erickson and Spann estimate [11] of 8.4 million barrels
per day and the N.P.C. estimate of 13.6 million barrels per day [36] at
real oil prices of $7 per barrel.1
The results of the simulations thus indicate that crude
oil prices of the order of $7 per barrel (in 1974 dollars) are not enough
to generate supplies of oil production that can match the demands. Fur-
thermore, the domestic crude oil reserves market will experience a short-
age, with the total additions to reserves substantially below even the
already low supply of production.
I
1See [31] for further discussion of these estimates.
2production estimates from Alaska are not included in this figure.
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The results thus sustain two of the major conclusions of
the M.I.T. Energy Policy Study Group [31]. Based on an extensive study
of all future energy sources, they have concluded that "...(real) prices
of $10.00 to $12.00 per barrel (oil-equivalent) will be necessary to
bring forth enough additional supplies of fossil fuels to satisfy demands
in domestic energy markets by that time," and also that "the current oil
price is high enough to extract present domestic oil and gas reserves
with great efficiency. A still higher price would have only a marginal
effect on exploration production over the next few years within the
United States."
4.3.5 Simulation of Alternative Economic Environments
One might be interested in knowing if the results obtained
for different regulatory policies are sensitive to the assumed values of
parameters denoting the general economic environment. All the simulations
reported in this chapter have therefore been repeated under alternative
("low" and "high") values for exogeneous parameters such as rate of growth
of G.N.P. and inflation rate. These results are not presented in detail
here, but it may be noted that the simulated values of discoveries, re-
serves additions and production showed very little sensitivity to changes
in these exogeneous parameters.
I
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that it is possible to
develop an econometric model to explain the oil and gas exploration
process which explicitly takes into account the characteristics of the
size distribution of reservoirs in nature as well as the physical process
of the evolution of a play. The structure of the model is based on the
premise that, to the extent possible, the physical process of depletion
should be separated from the influence of economic variables. This struc-
ture facilitates considerable simplifications in modelling as well as
interpretation of the results.
The model breaks some new ground to the extent that it gives
explicit consideration to the continuing process of depletion of the
resource base in nature and the role of geological uncertainty in govern-
ing the amount of exploratory activity, while at the same time taking
account of the fact that oil and gas are joint products of exploration
and must be treated symmetrically.
Some significant empirical results emerge from the study:
- the geogological process of depletion is a factor to be
reckoned with, and causes reductions in both the average sizes
of discoveries and probabilities of success as drilling con-
tinues within the same area.
- Increases in price incentives affect not only the total ex-
ploratory activuty, but the characteristics of the prospects
I
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drilled. On the average, the explorers move towards more
extensive drilling as prices go up. The recent increase in
the off-shore drilling activity is a demonstration of this
tendency.
- Geological uncertainty does have a role to play in determining
the individual explorer's decision.
- The results lend some support to the hypothesis of signifi-
cant "directionality" in the search for oil and natural gas.
- Own-price and cross-price elasticities of discoveries of oil
and natural gas are small, but not negligible.
The model has also demonstrated its usefulness for policy analysis
in a simulation context. Simulations of the model have been successfully
used to examine two currently relevant issues; namely, the regulation of
natural gas prices and the sensitivity of domestic oil supplies to price
incentives. By simulating alternative regulatory policies currently
under consideration for natural gas, we find that the gas shortage can
be ameliorated through phased deregulation of well-head prices. The
model also shows that the sensitivity of domestic supply of reserves
and production of oil to economic incentives is considerably lesser
than that suggested in many earlier studies. This means that the price
increases required for achieving self-sufficiency in fossil fuel markets
in the United States are probably substantially higher than those en-
visaged so far.
Finally, as far as future improvements in modelling along
these lines, two aspects come most immediately to mind. First, an
I
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explicit consideration of tax (and other fiscal) differentials across
states and over time would enable examination of fiscal policy alterna-
tives more directly than is now possible. Secondly, the role of future
expected technical progress could be modelled explicitly. Historically,
there is reason to believe that improvements in productivity of drilling
rigs, better methods of analyzing geological information, and other
technical improvements were approximately offset by cost increases in
raw materials and larger depths of drilling required, but this may not
be the case in the future and this possibility should be investigated.
I
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